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Abstract 
 
This project examines the expectation of inflation and its interaction with various 
financial markets. An overview of behavioral finance was given which illustrates how 
people form expectations and make decisions. Then the case of inflation expectation was 
analyzed in an attempt to measure it with an econometric model.  How investors perform 
with inflation expectation measures was investigated. Finally, the impact of technology 
on market efficiency was analyzed and implications of the findings were offered. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
October. This is one of the peculiarly dangerous months to speculate in stocks. 
The others are July, January, September, April, November, May, March, June, December, 
August, and February. 
                                                                                                             --Mark Twain 
 
Of all the decisions we face in our lives, investment decisions are perhaps the 
most difficult ones. The readily available news release reflects an ever changing financial 
world. The free and often conflicting analysis provided by experts often confuses 
people more than they help. Even the most intelligent analysts with rigorous training in 
finance sometimes make irrational choices and incur big losses.     
Human beings are emotional and hence do not make flawless decisions like 
computers. They do not follow a set of rules and act consistently in all occasions. They 
are, however, constrained by personal background and prejudice. Furthermore, they often 
suffer from group thinking. The very process of making investment decisions is such a 
fascinating subject that leads to the birth of behavioral finance and motivates various 
insightful researches.   
Over the years, behavioral finance has offered valuable new perspectives in 
evaluating investment decisions. We will survey this fast growing new field in chapter 
one and specifically undertake the formation of inflation expectation to analyze. We will 
illustrate the self-enforcing cycle between media, peoples expectation and choices. 
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Backed by theoretical analysis, we will then conduct empirical study to explore how 
financial markets interact with this expectation in chapter two. We will consider both 
quantitative and qualitative factors that cause current concerns of inflation. We will 
measure it with an econometric model, using data of Treasury Inflation Protected 
Security (TIPS) and Treasury Note yield rates, as well as other readily available data. 
Some past study has indicated that there exists a correlation between inflation expectation 
and term spread of yield rates, but it was inconclusive because of the limitation of data.  
During May 3rd, 2004 to May 20th 2005 Fed has increased the Federal Funds Rate seven 
times. We believe more convincing results will be obtained with this new data set. This 
study may provide new insight because TIPS was not introduced until 1997 and from 
1997 to 2004 the interest rate was steadily low. With the measure we obtained, we will 
then investigate how investors perform with this expectation in chapter three. We will 
also compare the interaction between inflation expectation and currency, stock and oil 
future market. In chapter four, we will offer implications and future possibilities, 
concluding this study. 
 
Goals of the project 
This project attempts to answer the following questions:  
1. How do people form inflation expectation and how can we measure it?  
2. Is there a relationship between the expected inflation and financial markets 
performance?  
3. If there is a relationship between financial markets performance and the 
expected inflation, how do these relationships differ from each other?  
 8
4. What are some practical implications of our findings? 
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Chapter 2 Behavioral Finance Overview 
2.1 A brief history of behavioral finance 
 Behavioral finance or behavioral economics is a relatively young field. It is 
generally regarded that it has mostly grown from ground in the past 25 years. Behavioral 
finance has been given more attention in recent years after Daniel Kahneman received 
Nobel Prize in Economical Sciences for having integrated insights from psychological 
research into economic science, especially concerning human judgment and decision-
making under uncertainty [1]. 
 In 1979, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky(1979) published Prospect Theory: 
An Analysis of Decision under Risk, which challenged the orthodox Expected Utility 
Theory[2]. They argued that people make different decisions according to gain or loss 
rather than expected financial wealth. Their experiment showed that people make 
inconsistent decisions when options are only offered in alternative forms. Their paper has 
inspired fruitful researches in following years, where the process of decision making is 
investigated from various perspectives. Psychologists have identified following 
characteristics in peoples decision making process [3]: 
Overconfidence: First, the confidence level people assign to their 
estimates are too narrow. Their 98% confidence intervals, for example, 
include the true quantity only about 60% of the time [Alpert and Raiffa 
(1982)]. Second, people are poorly calibrated when estimating 
probabilities: events they think are certain to occur actually occur only 
around 80% of the time. 
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Optimism and Wishful Thinking: People often appear to be 
overconfident about their abilities and choices. Typically, over 90% of 
those surveyed think they are above average in such domains as driving 
skill, ability to get along with people and sense of humor. 
Representativeness:  It leads to three kinds of biases: Self attrition, 
hindsight bias and sample size neglect. Self attrition describes the fact that 
people tend to ascribe success to their own talent while blame failures on 
bad luck. Hindsight bias is the tendency of people to believe, after an 
event has occurred, that they predicted it before it happened. If people 
think they predicted the past better than they actually did, they may also 
believe that they can predict the future better than they actually can. 
Sample size neglect means that in cases where people do not initially know 
the data-generating process, they will tend to infer it too quickly on the 
basis of too few data points. In situations where people do know the data-
generating process in advance, sample size neglect leads to gamblers 
fallacy effect. If a fair coin generates five heads in a row, people will say 
that tails are due.  
Belief perseverance: once people have formed an opinion, they cling to it 
too tightly and for too long. First, people are reluctant to search for 
evidence that contradicts their beliefs. Second, even if they find such 
evidence, they treat it with excessive skepticism. Some studies have found 
an even stronger effect, known as confirmation bias, whereby people 
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misinterpret evidence that goes against their hypothesis as actually being 
in their favor. 
Anchoring: When forming estimates, people often start with some initial, 
possibly arbitrary value, and then adjust away from it.  
Availability biases: When judging the probability of an event  the 
likelihood of getting mugged in Chicago, say  people often search their 
memories for relevant information. While this is a perfectly sensible 
procedure, it can produce biased estimates because not all memories are 
equally retrievable or available. More recent events and more salient 
events  the mugging of a close friend, say  will weigh more heavily and 
distort. 
They also indicated these together formed psychology base of behavioral finance.  
 Thaler and Barberis also argued that another base of behavioral finance is limit to 
arbitrage. Some other scholars believe that limit to arbitrage is where psychology tools 
are used for. Daniel Kaneman introduced the idea of bounded rationality with 
convincing experiment result. They investigated the human judgment process and 
identified systematic errors in the casual statistical judgments of statistically 
sophisticated researchers[4]. Their study lead to the prediction of long-lasting arbitrage 
position and challenged the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). Thaler (1994) and other 
researchers subsequently discovered a series of market abnormalities, which supported 
the theory that the irrationality of people cause persistent market inefficiency.  
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2.2 The origin of expectation 
 
 
                                   Figure 2.1 Expectation in a feedback loop 
 
The picture above illustrates the interaction between news media, personal 
expectation and market performance. It is a self-enforcing feedback loop in the language 
of system dynamics. We will begin our analysis with the interaction between news media 
and peoples expectation in this section and then go through the loop in section 2.3 and 
2.4.   
Instant news has been more and more convenient to access with the help of 
internet and cable TV. In the past, people have to open their financial newspaper and 
squeeze their eyes to find tiny quotes. What are worse, investors can only access previous 
days quotes on a daily newspaper. This one day lag can be expensive in a fast changing 
financial world. By contrast, nowadays even non-professional investors can easily obtain 
instant quotes of stocks and bonds online for free. Working in a financial company, I 
found that stock quotes are even available on a mini television in elevators. 
 
 
Expectation 
 
Market 
 
 
 
 
News 
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The progress in information distribution greatly facilitated people to collect 
information, as it did in the case of the May 11, 2005 While House evacuation. When 
news burst out that a plane was flying towards the White House and the alarm level was 
raised to red, the Dow Jones Industrial Average tumbled 100 points within hours. It then 
raised more than 100 points to finish as a 19 points net increase when alarm was cleared 
[5].  
Reports of news events with market sentiment like this are not uncommon in our 
daily life. If one opens television at diner time, one can easily find a number of financial 
news programs such as Mad Money and Nightly Business Report (NBR). Most of these 
news reports begin with a summary of daily performance in stock, bond, foreign 
exchange and commodity markets and end with repeating the major stock indices net 
change. Compared to other news report, a major feature of these reports is that reporters 
tend to relate major business events with market variations. For instance, we can often 
hear comments such as Stocks fall on news of lower retailing growth or Stocks rise 
on lower oil prices Sometimes these analyses even conflicts with each other. For 
instance, comments like Stocks fell even on news of lower oil price are not 
uncommon.  
A fundamental fact that distinguishes these reports from other news report is its 
lack of objectivity. Most other news reporters often lay down facts and figures first and 
then offer a follow up explanation, sometime by interviewing an expert. On the other 
hand, although business news reporters also quote from anonymous analysts, they often 
decisively relate market performance with major events in the first time. Comments such 
as Stocks rally on a stronger- than-expected GDP growth are often offered by reporters 
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without any quotation. This practice in business news creates an impression for the 
unsophisticated audience that there is definitely correlation or even causation between 
certain business events and market performance. As R. Shiller noted in Irrational 
Exuberance,  
there is a shortage within these accounts of relevant facts or 
considered interpretations of them. Many news stories in fact seem to have 
been written under a deadline to produce somethinganythingto go 
along with the numbers from the market. The typical such story, after 
noting the remarkable bull market, focuses on very short-run statistics.[6] 
The impression from various news resources plays an important role when people 
form their expectations. This is because when people hear similar news again, they tend 
to expect similar outcomes. For example, new concepts and new versions of a popular 
product are likely to attract consumers. Therefore, when one hears that a companys new 
product is welcome in the market, one cannot help but expecting the company will have 
higher-than-expected profits and hence a new high stock price.  For instance, when oil 
futures price climbs, the stock price of energy companies such as Exxon Mobile often 
increases accordingly. So next time when people hear news on oil shortage, they will 
naturally expect oil futures price to go up and consequently deduct that energy 
companies stocks are undervalued. They will then bid up energy companies stocks and 
then conclude they made a brilliant prediction.  
It is not difficult to see there is also a self-enforcing feedback loop in the above 
process. First, people believe that news on higher oil prices will lead to higher prices of 
energy companies stocks by past experience. They subsequently become a part of the 
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vast market force of demand of these stocks. They bid up prices of energy stocks, which 
in turn enforces their experience. 
Besides business news from various media, people also gather information from 
their personal life experiences. For instance, people often prefer companies that offer 
their favorite products or services. A friends father likes to drink a certain kind of beer. 
So when he started investing, he first bought the beer companys stock. It turns out that 
the stock did much worse than he expected. Similarly, Warren Buffet invested in 
American Express even when the company was in trouble because he observed that 
people continue to use American Expresss card. [7]  
In addition, people sometimes believe information from obscure sources such as 
rumors. For instance, when rumors came out that Apple computer was going to change its 
central processor supplier from IBM to Intel, although official spokesperson stated that 
the alleged change was a rumor, IBMs stock went down while Apples stock went up. [8] 
Recommendations from financial analysts also significantly affect peoples 
expectation. When business reporters interview financial analysts, they often ask them to 
recommend a couple of good buys and if they own the stock personally. The success of 
Mad Money, a program on which people ask analysts opinions on their own stocks, also 
shows peoples eager to consult alleged experts. Diverse financial books, especially those 
on investment strategies have been increasingly popular in recent years.  In 2004, 1770 
financial books are published.1 These books range from academic research to investment 
for dummies and they satisfy peoples desire to learn from and to be confirmed by 
experts. 
 
                                                
1 In courtesy of Christine Drew, Gordon Library, Worcester Polytechnic Institute. 
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2.2.3. The rationality of these expectations 
A number of biases played a role in forming the above expectation. As people 
who own the stocks want to make more capital gains and people dont own the stock 
want to take the speculative opportunity, they have a wishful thinking bias. They wish 
they will just be as right as right as last time and they expect their stock will go even 
further this time. They also suffer from hindsight bias in forming this expectation. After 
making profits in their stocks of energy companies last time, most investors find it is just 
too hard to stop expecting that stocks will go even higher when the gas price surges this 
time. Another bias in this formation process is the availability bias. Investors often fail to 
remind themselves of unfavorable experience they have with energy stocks and wish 
those experiences are only outliers or exceptions. Hence even though I do not own any 
energy stocks, I found it emotionally difficult to accept that stocks went down with a fall 
of oil prices. Similarly, when Robert Shiller tried to convince people that stock prices are 
too high, investors told him that You must be wrong, because stock price can only go 
higher.[9] 
More generally, another two biases also play a part when people collect 
information to form expectations. The first is the sample size bias. When people listen 
from one reporter or an expert, they often fail to question their credibility. They tend do 
believe one analysts idea is the whole markets feeling. As R. Shiller noted: 
Even if there is no manipulator fabricating false stories and deliberately 
deceiving investors in the aggregate stock market, tales about the market 
are everywhere. There are still many people (indeed, the stock brokerage 
and mutual fund industries as a whole) who benefit from telling stories 
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that suggest that the market will further. There is no reason that for these 
stories to be fraudulent; they need only emphasize the positive news and 
give less emphasize to the negative. [10] 
In the other case, my friends father bought the beer companys stock without any 
financial analysis; he essentially took his own preference to be the markets preference. 
Another bias that investors often suffer from is group think. In an ever-changing financial 
world, one can never be certain with future market performance. This uncertainty makes 
most investors aggressively seek so-called analysts confirmation. For instance, a lot of 
people aggregate various agencies trade recommendation (buy, hold, or sell) together. 
They count these three kinds of votes from analysts and base their decisions on the 
result. However, in doing so people ignored the fact that analysts, like other human 
beings, also seek confirmation from their peers and often fail to confront the majority 
opinion. 
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2.3 The emotional decision 
2.3.1 The character of investors 
People make investment decisions based on their expectation. This is because 
they pursuit returns and returns can only be realized in the future. Every finance text book 
tells us that stock prices reflect a companys future earnings and its ability to grow. In the 
future market, people trade commodities, currencies, and stocks that will only be 
delivered much later. The price of these instruments fluctuates even more with various 
peoples expectation and they fundamentally affect the instant markets. After exploring 
the formation process of expectation, we will analyze how people perform on their 
expectations in this section.  
As our society is aging and peoples life expectancy continues to grow, nowadays 
people are more conscious of their retirement. The emergence of various pension plans 
such as 401(k) almost makes everyone an investor. Staring in 2006, people can even 
invest their money in tax-sheltered health account. Therefore, people of diverse 
professions, of different ages and of education backgrounds are directly or indirectly 
participating in various financial markets on a daily basis. According to their investment 
approach, we can divide them into two groups, short-term traders who speculate in 
markets and long-term investors who buy and hold. Albert Hass offered a classic 
description of their characteristics:  
What qualities would we expect to find in a stock market player who will 
turn in a top performance? The successful long-term investor will require 
the fewest qualifications; the short-term trader who succeeds will need 
many, and must not be encumbered with any serious handicaps. The ideal 
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prospect will have decided for him that he wants to be in the market, and 
that he can afford it in terms of money, time, and emotional involvement. 
He has chosen the game that suits him best, is decisive, and has the 
courage to take action and pursue it unless circumstances change 
materially. He can distinguish between information and conjecture, rumor, 
or half-truth. He is not easily disturbed by the short-term behavior of his 
stocks, the market, or by other peoples opinions. His convictions are firm; 
he will not sell a stock merely because it drops, nor take a profit 
prematurely if his stock performs well. Still, he is on guard to avoid 
becoming entrapped by greed and is quick to recognize error, will accept 
it and cut short his loss. He has struck a workable balance between 
gullibility and cynicism. He has humility. If a trader, he makes a 
continuing effort to keep himself in rhythm with the market. He is aware of 
the markets potential rewards and risks, and is usually relaxed about his 
market activities. He expects no more of his stocks than they can 
providea means to make money. [11] 
 As we can see from the above paragraph, to be a short-term investor is by no 
means easy. But since to be a long term investor requires a discipline to keep hands off 
when market turns down, most people end up to be short-term investors. We will return 
to this point in Chapter 5. 
 
 
 
 20
2.3.2. The trading process  
 To understand the how investors make their decisions, we will analyze the trading 
process after a brief review of their character. More specifically, we will take up the stock 
market for our analysis. 
 A company launches Initial Public Offering (IPO) of its stocks to raise capital and 
it offers returns to investor in exchange. The return usually in two ways: dividends and 
capital gains. A company usually offers dividends once a year. It can decide how much 
dividend per share to offer based on its earnings and future investment opportunities. 
Usually companies will retain part or even all of its earnings for future growth. Certain 
companies like Microsoft do not offer dividends at all.2 Hence dividends are often far 
smaller on a per share basis compared to capital gain. Capital gain is the surplus of sales 
price over purchase price. Companies often retain their earnings and sometimes also buy 
back its own stocks to raise its assets per share at the end year; the stock price will then 
go up. Compared with dividends, capital gains can be realized at any time investors want, 
because stock prices fluctuate every trading day.  Short-term investors follow market 
movement closely because they focus more on capital gains.  
 In the trading, buyers and sellers offer their bids respectively and specialist match 
these offers in the best possible way. The fundamental law of demand and supply applies 
here as well: if there are more investors who want to buy a certain stock than those who 
want to sell, the price will go up. It is in this auction process that stock prices move up 
and down. Essentially, stock prices as determined by every participant. This is an 
interesting paradox given that people often feel stock prices are random and 
uncontrollable. 
                                                
2 Microsoft offered a huge dividend in Jan. 2005, but it didnt offer any dividends in the past.  
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2.3.3 The decision process 
 Since most short-term investors look for capital gains, they are constantly seeking 
the right time to buy or sell. A typical scenario would be that some people, based on 
various either analysis or just intuition as discussed above, decide a companys stock is a 
good buy. They subsequently bid the price of a stock up. Speculators who follow market 
movements will also decide the same stock is promising, or undervalued and starts to 
buy in this stock. The stocks price is then pushed even higher as more and more people 
jump in to bid for it. Through this feedback process, the stocks price climbs higher and 
higher and at some point, people will start to sell.  
 One might decide to sell simply because he gets into the market early enough 
such that he is satisfied with the profit. For instance, Google falls on some profit 
taking is often heard on television. Psychologists have found that people are more 
risk-averse when facing gains than when they are facing losses. D. Kahneman and A. 
Tversky conducted the following experiment: they ask people to choose between  
A. 50% win 1000, 50% win 0;and 
B. 450 for sure.  
Surprisingly, most people choose B, which contradicts with the orthodox theory that 
people make decisions to maximize expected utility.[12] Hence they will sell off early on 
and sometimes even though the price is still rising.  
 The Prospect Theory also predicts that people make decisions based on 
comparisons. For instance, if I tell you that a companys profit increased $1.5 dollar in 
the most recent quarter, what will one think? One might think that the company did pretty 
well and some others might even bet on the stock of this company is going to rally. 
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However, what if I further disclose the fact that the company missed Wall Street analysts 
profit projection by two cents per share?  Most investors will immediately change their 
decisions to just the opposite: sell or short the stock because it underperformed, even 
lacking the knowledge of industry average or any other statistics. In fact, this is exactly 
what happened to Nike at the end of second quarter of 2005. 
 It might also because past experiences tell us that the stock cannot climb infinitely, 
so one believes sooner or later the price curve is going to turn down. As discussed earlier, 
the Representativeness bias just predicts this kind of behavior. After the market increases 
consecutively for a few days, most analysts will expect market is due to drop. 
 In addition, one might decide to sell because colleagues or friends of one have 
sold or because one has recently obtained some negative inside information about the 
company. Moreover, it might because his sophisticated investment advisor, after 
conducting comprehensive research and financial analysis, signaled a sell 
recommendation. All these possible causes lead to the invariable consequence: to cash 
out the stock. 
 But before investors finally click the button or make the call, they need some 
justification of their decision. They will justify any movements by aggressively seeking 
related news and analysis, which suffer from various biases presented earlier and boost 
their confidence.  
 This common scenario will repeat itself later on. It is during this feedback process, 
the price curves cycle up and down and move forward, leaving millions people running 
after the crest. Various analysts, especially those who are called chartists spend most of 
their time trying to decipher market psychology, or trends. For instance, they invented the 
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trading technique swing trading, in which they determine a channel of stock price 
based on past experience. They then draw two lines on the price chart to specify the best 
estimate of highest price and lowest price. Trading becomes easy after the range is fixed. 
When prices jump out of the upper bound, they sell stocks they own and when prices 
drop below the lower bound they consider to buy in a new stock and wait for the next 
peak.[13] Indeed, many online brokers offer program to implement such a strategy 
automatically.  
 To conclude, trading in the short run is often emotional rather than rational. As 
Robert Shiller pointed out 
 Conceivably, a bubble might exist only because people think that 
there is a temporary bubble and want to ride with it for a 
while. Feedback loop dynamics can sometimes generate complex and 
even random behavior. The so-called random number generator in some 
computer is simply nonlinear feedback loops. [14] 
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2.4 The sentimental media 
 We have just analyzed how investors collect information, form expectation and 
then make decisions on expectation. After going from News to Expectation and from 
Expectation to Market, we will go back to News in this section, complete the feedback 
loop we illustrated at the beginning of this chapter. 
 We hold it evident that news media play a pivotal role in the market feedback 
process. They propagate miscellaneous information for investors to judge, to analyze and 
to decide. News media then record and reflect decisions people make, actions people take, 
as well as those delighted and depressed faces. News media starts the loop and reinforce 
it.  
 News, especially business news has expanded at an astonishing speed in recent 
years, mainly due to the advance of technology and a persistent market boom in the 
1990s. The emergence of news channels such as CNBC made it possible to keep updated 
instantly of any new market movements, macroeconomic indicators change, professional 
analyses or congress testimony. It is amazing to see that on a single screen, a chart of 
various market indices is presented in the middle, individual stocks variation is showed 
in the right corner and a reporter stands in the left corner of screen, trying to capture 
traders sentiment. However, for most investors, this is far from enough information. 
 Internet made it possible to review different TV news and newspapers instantly 
and virtually from every corner of the world. The distribution of news is hence more 
diversified and efficient. Internet by far facilitated reporters to get tuned to each others 
observations and comments. Indeed, most reporters constantly reach out to be aware of 
what happening in other parts of the world and what impacts they may have impact in 
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domestic market. With globalization, an international perspective often proves to be 
valuable to investors. Since reporters are able integrate various resources into their own 
news, they multiplied the impact of news media on investors. 
 A typical example would be the trading panic on May 11th, 2005 caused by an 
error in translation. A reporter for the China News Service put together a story of 
potential impact of a reevaluation of the Chinese currency. This piece of news is then 
captured by the Peoples Daily online, one of Chinas official newspapers. When 
translated into English, the original story was distorted to the Chinese government is 
going let their currency appreciate at a specific percentage in the coming month. 
Bloomberg use search software on the internet to gather all kinds of news. When they 
obtained this piece of information, eager to, make a headline they sent it out without any 
confirmation from Chinese officials. It is estimated that about $2 billion was traded 
within minutes that the Bloomberg issued the story. [15] This story clearly demonstrates 
that how closely traders scrutinize any tiny movement in the market through internet. 
 In addition, News media will certainly notice any significant movement in the 
market and general economy and report it as soon as possible. For example, the Dow 
dropped 150 points, the biggest one day drop since last year will be heard every once 
in a while. As Shiller noted, people like here new change, be it the biggest boom since 
last week, last month or last year.[16] These significant fluctuations, complied with 
professional analyses, will then be presented to investors for further reference. In 
essence, news media is a mirror where investors can see their own actions and analyze 
them. 
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 Furthermore, people often like to follow analysts recommendation and buy hot 
stock in the news. News media certainly understand this need and constantly provide 
viewers with this information. To demonstrate, I would like quote an investment 
decisions from another IQP[17]:  
The main reason we took a chance by choosing ISON was the fact that 
they used weapon detection technology.  In these times of terrorists and the war 
in Iraq, a company like this could do quite well for themselves.  
 Clearly, the comprehensive news coverage of war on terror played role in this decision.  
 As mentioned earlier, a lot of times market sentiment depends on comparison. 
News media nearly always compare the status quo with past experiences since people 
tend to believe that what happened in the past will at least provide some indication for 
future. When it comes to the end of a quarter, the summary of a stock or the overall 
market will now only include change from last quarter, but change compared to the same 
quarter last year, change from historical average, etc..  
 In conclusion, by summarizing the market in a way that satisfies peoples 
psychological needs and by facilitating the exchange of information, news media greatly 
reinforced the loop.  
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Chapter 3 The Inflation Sentiment 
 In last chapter, we offered an overview of the interaction between news media, 
peoples expectation and market performance. We will focus on inflation expectation in 
this chapter and illustrate the feedback loop we constructed in following chapters. 
3.1 Contemporary concerns                                                                               . 
 During 2000-2001, the American economy experienced a mild recession triggered 
by bursts of dot com bubbles and the September 11 tragedy. To help economic recovery 
the Fed decreased the Federal Funds Rate eleven times during 2000. The Federal Funds 
Rate dropped dramatically from 6% to 1.75% and has stayed at a historically low level 
since. A low interest rate level encourages consumer credit spending and business 
investment, especially in a credited based society like the United States. The GDP growth 
and business environment has recovered since 2003 and inflation measures such as 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) have accelerated. The Fed then declared the inflation control 
its top priority.  
 Since then, the investment worlds sentiment on inflation has been increasing 
accordingly. TV News, economic magazines and newspapers also shifted their worry 
from unemployment and deficient demand to inflation measurers.  The study noted that 
three factors appear most often in economic columns of newspapers and business news 
on television: the twin deficit, the weak dollar and the high oil price. Although this is far 
from a comprehensive list of contemporary causes of inflation, their high visibility makes 
them major causes of investors worry. A remarkable reported change in one of these 
factors can often convince investors to take actions with their investment. Almost 
 28
everyday we can hear on Nightly Business Report or read on the Wall Street Journal: A 
lower oil price helped the Dow to climb Hence we will mainly focus on these three 
factors. 
 Most economists, whether Keynesians or Monetarists agreed on that a persistent 
federal budget deficit is not healthy for economy. In her recent speech, Hilary Clinton 
described the record 412 billion budget deficit as a birth tax on every American citizen. 
When the government uses more money, it defers peoples spending and prevents the 
market from allocating resources efficiently. Moreover, a high level of budget deficit 
itself leads to substantial interest cost. We all know personal loans will keep growing 
even if we dont borrow new credits. The federal government faces similar difficulties in 
reducing its debt.  Since the federal government finances its budget deficit mainly by 
issuing treasury bills and a substantial amount of these public debts are held in foreign 
investors central banks reserves. These public debts are also counted as foreign 
investment, which contributes to a high level of trade deficit. This close link between the 
two deficits qualifies them as a twin. Without continuous and instant effort to reduce 
debts, the twin deficit will grow to an unsustainable level, which makes people lose 
confidence in paper money, as it did in the case of hyperinflation as in Germany and 
China in history. In a word, the twin deficit causes inventors concern of future inflation. 
 The dollar has been consistently weak since 2002. Like any other financial 
instruments, the value of a currency is determined by the basic rule of market supply and 
demand: when more people sell dollar instead of buying it, it depreciates against other 
currencies, most remarkably the euro in the past two years. As mentioned before, this 
suggests that investors overall are somewhat pessimistic about the U.S. economy. 
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Furthermore, the fact that more and more U.S. Treasury Securities are held in foreign 
investors hands is especially worrisome. As the dollar depreciates sharply against the 
euro in the past two years, central bank regulators have been increasingly cautious about 
the future value of U.S. currency. For example, in diversifying their portfolio, Korean 
central bank has already begun to sell some U.S. dollar holdings, which triggered some 
speculators selling. Analysts worries that if countries with huge U.S. dollar reserves like 
China begin to dump dollars, it could well lead to a fad of selling just like the 2000 
Internet bubble and other stock crashes in history. This could be disastrous to a big 
importing economy like the U.S because the depreciation will lead to more selling and 
will lift the twin deficit even higher. Since depreciation of currency is the ultimate result 
and representation of inflation, investors often draw inferences of inflation from 
variations of U.S. dollar.  
             Soaring oil prices contributed to our high trade deficit since more than half of oil 
in the U.S. are imported. Oil is a very limited natural resource and has been diminishing 
at an astonishing pace during past twenty years. To make matters worse, economic 
growth often requires higher demand in oil. This is especially true in developing 
countries without good reservation technology. As many economists have pointed out, 
the fact that fast growing Asian economies need more and more oil will only lift the price 
higher. The increasing conflict between peoples unlimited desire for oil and the limited 
supply has sent oil price higher and higher. From basic economic principles, we can 
deduce that a high price will offer strong incentives to increase oil supply and to decrease 
oil demand by developing new energy resources, as Fed chairman Alan Greenspan noted 
in his testimony.[18] In the short-run, however, it is a real concern because it can be very 
 30
volatile and often causes market sentiment. Speculators bid the summer oil future even 
higher than immediate delivery price. In addition, the demand for oil is very inelastic in 
short-run. From gasoline to plastic bags, petroleum industry plays a crucial role in 
peoples daily life. For instance, consumers can choose to defer the purchase of an SUV, 
but they cannot choose to change their SUV when oil prices increase. Indeed, both 
General Motor and Ford Corporations sales are hurt by high oil prices but the way 
people shop and drive has not changed.[19] Therefore, an increase in oil price will 
definitely accelerate not only the CPI but even the core inflation index excluding food 
and energy, causing worries of inflation and Feds increase of Federal Funds Rate. 
 As pointed out earlier, these three factors are closely linked together rather than 
isolated from each other. For instance, since the Iraq war in 2003, oil price almost tripled 
and the dollar tumbled by about 30% against euro and other major currencies.  
 
Figure 3.1 Oil price and U.S. Currency (Source: The Wall Street Journal, Apr.24, 
2005 ) 
 31
 We conclude this section by summarizing several self-enforcing circles discussed 
above: 
• High budget deficit->high interest cost->high budget deficit 
• High budget deficit-> weak dollar->high trade deficit 
• High oil price-> High Trade Deficit-> weak dollar 
• With some help of system dynamics, these relationships could be 
presented in a more rigorous manner.  
 
 
3.2. Measure the expectation of inflation  
 After a review of major contemporary concerns of inflation, this section attempts 
to measure these concerns using both quantitative and qualitative analysis.        
 
3.2.1 The qualitative measure  
 As mentioned earlier in 2.4, media plays an important role in the formation of 
expectations. Everyday macroeconomics indicators as well as analysts comments are 
presented to investors on television, newspaper, etc.. Therefore, this project will primarily 
take economics news and analysis p quantitative measures of inflation expectation. An 
earlier Princeton study identified three kinds of news as potential causes of inflation 
sentiment: news on budget deficit, news on FMOC meeting and news on oil prices. The 
study also noted the difficulty of investigating effects of these three kinds of news. This is 
because building significant relationships requires regression analysis, which obviously 
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cannot be done with qualitative factors.3 The study also offered an excellent way to look 
into the interaction between news and peoples expectation by quantifying these 
measures.  
The Princeton study used adjusted monthly receipts for the three previous years 
and seasonally adjusted tax employment data for the three previous years to represent 
budget deficit news. Although this is a creative approach, the result is not conclusive. We 
believe that this is mainly due to federal government receipts is not a highly visible 
indicator on media. More often people will just act on the single budget deficit number 
because of its much higher accessibility. The fact that federal budget deficit is steadily 
decreasing may also cause the result inconclusive. On the other hand, as we analyzed in 
the last section, the twin deficit do account for a large part of contemporary concerns. We 
will relate some news to daily change of inflation expectation in the way the author did.  
We agree with the author that FOMC meeting announcements plays a crucial in 
forming inflation expectation. As often noted by the media, investors scrutinize the 
minutes word by word and react to minutes. A typical example would be the Feds 
statement revision on May.3rd and the market disturbance.[20] The Fed increased federal 
funds rate by 0.25% as most experts expected, but it omitted Longer-term inflation 
expectations remain well contained unintentionally. Investors interpreted the omission 
as a future 0.5% increase and acted on this fear. The crude oil futures plunged 2.8% to a 
two and a half month low. Just before the end of trading, the Fed added back the sentence 
and the bond market gained slightly, which means yield rate fell accordingly. This 
phenomenon also showed that people do quantify qualitative information through 
                                                
3 Treasury Inflation Protected Securities: Measuring Expected Inflation and the effects of Current Events on 
Expected Inflation. This paper will be referred to as the Princeton study subsequently, since the author is an 
unknown Princeton student.  
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complicated process in their minds. The Princeton study used the 10 year to 3 month term 
spread of ordinary treasury securities to represent the Feds monetary policy and obtained 
significant results. This study used ten year to one month term spread of treasury 
securities and achieved similar results.  
The Princeton study also used crude oil future price and weighted dollar exchange 
rate as exploratory variables. We will look into the interaction between various financial 
markets and the inflation expectation systematically in chapter 4.  
 
3.2.2 Quantitative measure 
  The principal qualitative measures this study will use is derived from the 
Treasury Inflation Protected Security (TIPS) yield rates and the Treasury Note (T-Note) 
yield rates.  
 The yield rate of a financial instrument can often be decomposed in the following 
equation: 
                                                    Yield=DRP + LP + RI+IP                                           (3.1) 
where DRP is the default risk premium, LP is liquidity premium,  RI is the real interest 
rate (or real rate of return) and  IP is the inflation premium. The default risk is the chance 
that an issuer fails to meet its liabilities. For instance, a company may fail to pay the 
coupon it promised on its bond, or, in some cases, even the face value of the bond. Hence 
for corporate bonds, the default risk premium is usually a substantial component. 
However, for both TIPS and T-Notes, default risk premium is close to zero since the 
federal government has the best ability to pay any debts it issues. Debtors usually need to 
pay a liquidity premium as part of the return because investors may not easily transfer 
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their investment into cash. For example, an investor who puts money into a house cannot 
easily get cash back and invest in other instruments with the same yield. To contrast, 
treasury securities are in general very liquid.4 Treasury securities are the most common 
investment choice. Most investors hold treasury securities as part of their portfolio for 
their low default risk. Intuitional investors like pension funds and insurance companies 
are required by law to invest in low default risk bonds like treasury bonds. In addition, 
the Fed expands and or contracts money supply by buying or selling U.S. treasury 
securities. Therefore, treasury securities are actively traded in the open market each day, 
which means investors can easily sell their bonds to get cash5.  In conclusion, for purpose 
of this study, we will assume that both default risk premium and liquidity risk premium 
are zero. 
 For short term treasury bonds, or T-Bills, the maturities of the bond are usually 
within a year and hence the inflation risk premium is generally low. On the contrary, a 
ten-year T-note will subject to a much higher inflation risk. For instance, assume the CPI 
will be 3% on average during the next ten years; a $1,000 face value bond will have a 
buying power of $744. The uncertainty of inflation is hence long-term investors biggest 
worry. In 1997, Treasury Inflation Protected Securities was introduced into the market. 
The TIPS are offered at maturities of 5, 10 and 20 years. Unlike other long-term bonds, 
its face value will be adjusted semiannually according the Consumer Price Index (CPI), 
which effectively protects investors from inflation. 
  This feature of TIPS also provides researchers a very good way to gauge inflation. 
Because it is adjusted for inflation, the yield rate of TIPS is often considered the real 
                                                
4 TIPS is a little less liquid, we will come back to this later. 
5 Tax laws and transaction cost discourage frequent trading of individual investors. 
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interest rate (RI).6 According to the principal of equivalence, the price of the bond, which 
is the present value of the cash flows, is obtained by discounting the face value and the 
interest (coupon) payments. Coupon rates of TIPS and T-notes are determined by the 
bond issuer, the U.S. Treasury Department. Investors multiply the coupon rate by the face 
value of a bond to obtain the value of each coupon payment. Discounting the coupon 
payments and a desired return rate, investors will obtain their prices and offer bids 
accordingly. The market yield rate is determined by auction processes in the open market, 
which reflects each investors desired real return or return containing inflation premium. 
The hiding inflation premium component will be revealed by the equation:  
                                                   T-Note yield = (1+Π)(1+RI)                                        (3.2) 
where Π is expected inflation rate. In the following, we will then obtain various inflation 
expectations by simply dividing T-note yield rate to TIPS yield of the same maturity. 
 The Princeton study also considered the effects of tax on the yield rate of TIPS. 
The study assumes 30% tax rate for all the coupon income and principal adjustments and 
multiply each cash flow by 0.7. It then equates the price of a 10-year T-Note and the 
price of a 10-year TIPS bond to solve for inflation expectation. Admittedly, the special 
tax method of TIPS does have some impact on peoples decision of returns.7 However, 
we believe professional investors will take tax on the interest income into consideration 
when offering their bids. Another problem is the tax rate on capital gains, which is the 
principal adjustment, is different from that of interest income.    In addition, as mentioned 
above, market yield rates are derived from price offerings, not the other way around. 
Therefore, use yield rate and force the price of two bonds to be equal to solve backward 
                                                
6 The lagging indexation effect and tax law still keep some inflation risk, we will come back to in 3.3. 
7 We will come back to this in 3.3.  
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is not an appropriate way of using raw data. It is also artificial because represent people 
may have different preferences over different securities. For example, some highly risk 
adverse investor may choose TIPS even though returns are the same. Furthermore, the 
algorithm is based on the proposition that if there is difference between the two bonds, 
people will bid up the lower priced bond. The limit to arbitrage theory mentioned earlier 
seriously challenges this assumption. In conclusion, we believe that our approach will be 
sufficient to attain a reasonably accurate quantitative measure of the inflation expectation. 
 The study used above approach and calculated both inflation expectation and 
percent change of it on a daily basis from May 3, 2004 to May 20, 2005. The result is 
summarized in Appendix 1. It is worth noting that not all days with significant variations 
coincide with major news. Shiller suggested it is probably because some news only 
caused peoples attention to look back into other news.[21] Below is a graph of daily 
percent change. 
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            Figure 3.2 10 year Inflation Expectation Daily Percent Change 
 The author of the Princeton study acknowledged that their study experienced only 
one Federal Funds Rate change. Compared to the Princeton study, this study has far more 
experiences of interest raise and somewhat more observations. As mentioned in the 
introduction, since the TIPS went on the market, the horizon we covered is the only 
period that the Fed increased interest consecutively. The Princeton study also noted that 
in a lot of days during their study the inflation expectation is unchanged.[22] They further 
noted that these days are very troublesome because the study cannot show Fed meeting 
has any impact on inflation expectation, nor can it show the meeting does not have any 
impact.[23] 
 Our study tracked the Fed meeting minutes release from May 2004 to May 2005 
and results are summarized below. Dates with Federal Funds increase are in bold. 
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Date 10 yr TIPS 
10 yr T-
Notes 
Pi_10 
year 10 year Pi Daily Percent Change 
5/4/2004 2.10% 4.56 2.171429 0.1829076 
5/6/2004 2.15% 4.63 2.153488 -1.901831206 
5/13/2004 2.18% 4.85 2.224771 -0.046536365 
6/30/2004 2.10% 4.62 2.2 2.978723404 
7/1/2004 2.04% 4.57 2.240196 1.827094474 
7/8/2004 2.02% 4.49 2.222772 -1.210121012 
8/10/2004 1.90% 4.32 2.273684 -1.721593704 
8/12/2004 1.81% 4.27 2.359116 2.045483747 
8/19/2004 1.76% 4.22 2.397727 3.731463572 
9/21/2004 1.80% 4.05 2.25 -0.491400491 
11/10/2004 1.75% 4.25 2.428571 -1.089902203 
11/12/2004 1.71% 4.2 2.45614 1.135190918 
11/18/2004 1.64% 4.12 2.512195 -1.089902203 
12/14/2004 1.62% 4.14 2.555556 1.362179487 
12/16/2004 1.64% 4.19 2.554878 -1.927664142 
1/4/2005 1.78% 4.29 2.410112 -3.139692406 
1/11/2005 1.76% 4.26 2.420455 -0.135092181 
2/2/2005 1.70% 4.15 2.441176 -1.764705882 
2/23/2005 1.64% 4.27 2.603659 1.354539769 
3/2/2005 1.69% 4.38 2.591716 0 
3/22/2005 1.87% 4.63 2.475936 -1.618443886 
3/24/2005 1.90% 4.6 2.421053 0.833428474 
4/12/2005 1.73% 4.38 2.531792 3.547444307 
4/19/2005 1.62% 4.21 2.598765 1.029288461 
5/3/2005 1.64% 4.21 2.567073 -1.829268293 
         
Table 3.1 Expected Inflation Change on days of FOMC Meeting 
         
3.3. Regression models and conclusions 
 We calculated expected inflation rate using daily yield rates of 10-year TIPS and 
10 year T-Notes published by the U.S. Department of Treasury. We chose the 10 year 
yield rates because it is generally considered a benchmark for investors and it is the most 
closely followed by economists. We subsequently used the expected inflation as the Y 
variable, the 10 year to 1 month term-spread of treasury security yield rate and the 
previous days inflation expectation rates as X variable to perform a multiple regression. 
The study achieved encouraging results, which is summarized in the table below. 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT      
      
Regression Statistics     
Multiple R 0.968283     
R Square 0.937571     
Adjusted R Square 0.937091     
Standard Error 0.035683     
Observations 263     
      
ANOVA      
 df SS MS F 
Significance 
F 
Regression 2 4.971715 2.485857 1952.376 2.5E-157
Residual 260 0.331044 0.001273   
Total 262 5.302759    
      
 Coefficients
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value  
Intercept 0.305701 0.083884 3.64435 0.000324  
Previous day's PI 0.889478 0.029907 29.74167 1.18E-85  
10 year to 1 mon spread -0.0167 0.005855 -2.85263 0.004684  
 
Table 3.2 Regression Summary 
 
As we can see from the table, the econometric has a very high significance level. 
We are more than 99% confident that our result in valid. The adjusted R- square is 93.7%, 
which indicates that our model can explain 93.7% of the variation of the inflation 
expectation. The previous inflation expectation has a coefficient of 0.8894 and a 
significance level higher than 99%. The term spread also has a significance level higher 
than 99%, and a coefficient of -0.0167.  
Before we draw any inference from our findings, we will note some limitations of 
our approach as promised earlier. First, since TIPS bonds are not introduced to the market 
until 1997, the outstanding bonds and choices of term to maturities are much more 
limited than ordinary treasury securities. This might lead to a little illiquidity of TIPS 
bonds as mentioned earlier. Second, the trading volume of TIPS bonds is relatively small 
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compared to other treasury securities because of its tax method. For T-Notes, unrealized 
interest income is not taxed until the bond is sold or it matures. On the contrary, TIPS 
principal adjustment will be taxed on a yearly basis no matter whether bond holders 
realized their gain or not. Over a 10 year horizon, compounding effect will substantially 
reduced investors capital gain. As noted in the Princeton study, when inflation is very 
high, investors are not really sheltered from the inflation risk as they should have been. 
This tax policy also brings a lot of inconvenience for investors tax preparation. Investors 
are hence less enthusiastic than they could have been about TIPS. However, TIPS fund 
has made TIPS more popular and the trading volume of TIPS has been increasing in the 
last two years.[24] Third, this study only covers the most recent interest increase period, 
not a whole business cycle. Fourth, since the major rating agencies downgraded GM and 
Fords corporate bonds to junk status in May 2005, a lot of investors become more 
cautious in corporate bonds and invest more in treasury securities. The price of treasury 
bonds is bided up and the yield rate is hence pushed down. We noted that treasury yield 
rates have been decreasing while the Fed kept increasing the federal funds rate. This 
abnormal response of bond market to the interest raise may indicate that overall people 
expect long term inflation to be low and the economy is slowing down. However, since 
we only included twenty observations in May 2005, we believe the impact of corporate 
bond rating changes is limited.  
  The study obtained the following econometric model:  
                   Pi=0.305701 + 0.889478*Pi_previous + -0.0167*Term_spread8             (3.3) 
The coefficient of previous days is 0.889. This indicates a strong positive relationship 
between expected inflation and previous days inflation expectation. This result is 
                                                
8 Term spread is 10 year treasury yield minus 1-month treasury yield. 
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consistent with our hypothesis that investors make their decisions on previous markets 
performance. We also argue that this is a dominant factor since there is not a consistent 
relationship between Feds statement and inflation expectation. What is more, the 
coefficient of Term spread is only -0.0167, which seems to have only limited impact on 
inflation expectation. 
 Compared to the Princeton study, the coefficient of previous days inflation 
expectation is very similar. The corresponding coefficient in that study is 0.87898. We 
also noted that in both studies, the significance level of previous days inflation 
expectation is far higher than other components in the model. For instance, in our study 
the p-value of previous days inflation expectation is 1.15*E-85, while the p-value of 
intercept is only 3.24*E-4. In the Princeton study the corresponding p-values are 6.40*E-
101 and 9.54*E-6, respectively. This also demonstrates previous days inflation 
expectation in the most important factor in investors decision making process. On the 
other hand, in the Princeton study, the term spread9 has a positive coefficient of 0.13 and 
p-value of 5.35*E-6. We believe is due to the fact that the Princeton study also included 
exchange rate and oil price in the model. These three factors are somewhat correlated and 
they together explain more variation of inflation expectation.10 The author hence argued 
that a smaller term spread indicates a looser monetary policy and that it will positively 
affect inflation expectation. Because of the lack of monetary policy tightening or loosing 
in their study, we do not agree with this proposition. Therefore, using term spread to 
quantify monetary policy change may not be the best way.  
                                                
9 The Princeton study used 10 year treasury yield minus 3-month treasury yield. 
10 In the Princeton study, the adjusted R square is 0.989. 
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 In addition, we do not have evidence that is beyond reasonable doubt to prove 
there is a relationship between Fed statement and market inflation expectation. This may 
be surprising at a first look. However, when the Fed gave its first interest increase in three 
years, it symbolizes a reverse in its monetary policy. It shifted the whole markets focus 
from deflation risk to inflation risk. Hence we would argue that the first move to tighten 
monetary policy has the greatest psychological impact. Every subsequent Fed meeting 
minutes, public statement, and congress testimony are closely followed. Various 
consulting firms and investment banks economists gather miscellaneous information 
such macroeconomic indicators from media and government to offer their advice. 
Investors then make their judgment and often take actions before increase. Therefore, 
successive increases are often anticipated by institutional investors. For instance, 
comments such as The Fed will have a meeting today and it is generally expected to 
increase the federal funds rate by 0.25% appear almost every time on the meeting days 
newspapers. Likewise, in Feds meeting minutes of Dec.14, 2004, the board of governors 
noted:  
The FOMC decision in November to raise the intended federal funds 
rate 25 basis points and its attendant public statement were apparently 
anticipated by the market, so that the reaction was muted.[25] 
In other words, there is often little surprise before the Feds consecutive increases. Indeed, 
on Jun.30, 2004, when the Fed brought first increase in three years, the inflation 
expectation jumped 2.97% from the previous day. It was the highest one-day inflation 
expectation increase in the period from May 3, 2004 to Aug.18 2004.11 Subsequently, 
while FOMC meeting minutes release do sometimes cause significant increase of 
                                                
11 For complete data, please Appendix 1. 
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inflation expectation, the variation of inflation expectation on the day that Fed announced 
increase was quite moderate. On the other hand, during every two increases, we can 
always see substantial increase or decrease in market expectation. We believe these 
variations are caused by other factors such as fluctuation in various financial markets. 
Indeed, the Fed seriously considers market responses when making its decisions. As 
mentioned earlier, we will discuss the interaction between diverse financial markets and 
inflation expectation in the next chapter. 
 In conclusion, the study discovered that investors base their decisions primarily 
on previous days market performance. Compared to this relationship, the impact of 
Feds consecutive interest increase is relatively limited. 
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Chapter 4 the Impact of Inflation Expectation 
 
 In the last chapter, we analyzed major current concerns of inflation. We also 
discussed measures of inflation expectation and provided an econometric model for it. 
We argue that inflation expectation has substantial impacts on various financial markets 
and financial markets respond strongly to these impacts. We will explore this interaction 
in this chapter. 
 
4.1. Inflation: the center of expectation 
 In various expectations people form for financial markets, the inflation 
expectation lies in the center. All other expectations are either partially determined by or 
represented by the inflation expectation. We will begin our analysis from a 
macroeconomic perspective.  
Traditional Keynesian economics uses the IS-LM model to describe the general 
economy. Although the model has been criticized since it was invented, it is still 
generally accepted and widely used in college economics course. In an IS-LM model, the 
economy is divided in to the real side and the money side. A very important assumption 
of the IS-LM Model is that price level is stable in the short-run. This is because it takes 
time for all business sectors to realize that the general money supply has increased and to 
adjust their prices accordingly. Traditionally, it is regarded that the IS-LM model is not 
appropriate for analyzing inflation[26], since the price level is fixed in the IS-LM model. 
However, as discussed in the last chapter, people tend to use potential interest rate change 
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to guess future inflation. Hence this model is of crucial importance in analyzing inflation 
expectation. We will come back to this point later. 
The IS curve represents the real side and describes the correlation between 
investment and saving. Lets begin with the general equation of GDP:  
    Y=C+I+G+X-M,          (4.1) 
where Y is the output, C is consumption, G is government spending and X-M is net 
export. To simplify out analysis, lets assume X-M=0. Hence the demand and supply 
of goods or capital should achieve equilibrium and equal C+G+I in the market. In the 
private sector,  
    C=Ca + b*Yd ,          (4.2) 
where Ca is the exogenous spending and Yd is disposable income. The coefficient b is 
called the marginal propensity to consume. In addition,  
    Yd=Y-T,          (4.3) 
and  
    T=Ta+t*Y,          (4.4) 
where Ta is the exogenous part of taxes T. Also G=Ga, that is government spending is 
exogenous in our system. Finally,  
    I=Ia+c*Y-d*I,          (4.5) 
where Ia is the exogenous part of I. Solve for equilibrium, we obtain:  
                        d*i=(c+b-1-t)*Y + Ca-b*Ta + Ia + Ga,                                      (4.6) 
Since b+c+t must be less than 1(because each component is only a fraction of Y), the 
curve have a negative slope. Indeed, in the short-run, a higher interest rate will encourage 
people to save and discourage private spending, which in turn discourage output. With 
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fewer orders in the pipeline and higher capital cost, business will be reluctant to borrow 
which make investment difficult. This may in turn decrease Y and cause potential 
recession. It is worth noting that although government spending is exogenous in our 
model, it plays an important role. As mentioned in 3.1, a higher government spending 
means less private spending and investment and gives upward pressure to interest rate. 
The LM curve represents the money side and describes the correlation between 
money supply and demand. Here we have  
                                               Ms/P=L(Y,i),                                                     (4.7) 
where Ms is the supply of money, P is the price level, L is the demand of money and i is 
the interest rate. Let  
                                                L=e*y-f*I,                                                          (4.8)  
because higher output lead to higher demand for currency and higher interest lead 
to lower demand of money. Assume P=1 we have 
                                               f*i=e*Y-Ms.                                                        (4.9) 
Hence interest rate is positively correlated with output in the money market.  
It is the interest rate that connects the two sides of economy. When economy is 
growing too fast and the inflation pressure is accelerating, the Fed will step forward and 
raise interest rate. This will effectively discourage spending in a credit based society like 
the U.S. and contract the economy. For instance, when interest rate are higher, household 
will be reluctant to purchase durable good such as house or car, for which people often 
need some credit. On the other hand, during a recession, the Fed will decrease interest 
through its open market operation and stimulate consumption, which through a chain of 
reactions expand the economy. We can see from the above that the general economy 
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cycles during this process. Historically, there is always a series of increases after 
decreases and vice versa.  
Almost every time the Fed raises interest rate, their justification is to keep 
inflation pressure well contained. The business world follows Feds interpretation of 
macroeconomic factors closely, not only because their views are from brilliant 
professional economists, but also because their view indicate their potential action. 
A subtle change in the Feds rhetoric as demonstrated in 3.1 will often lead their 
anticipation of an interest rate change. Since the interest rate level is crucial for firms 
capital budgeting, the business world constantly keeps its eye on the Feds every 
statement to gauge the inflation pressure. Investors will certainly be unhappy with a 
higher interest environment, which will then cause a chain of reactions in the financial 
market. Compared to firm specific news, news on inflation has far more impact on the 
general market because every firm is subject to overall economic environment change 
and their aggregate is the whole market. Therefore, inflation expectation is by far the 
most important expectation. 
For instance, people often look at oil price and try to find the correlation between 
oil price and stock performance, but as we can see the correlation is sometimes positive 
and sometimes negative. We believe that oil price partially affects inflation expectation, 
which in turn affects market performance with other factors.  
 Furthermore, within a quarter (which is often considered short-run), only inflation 
expectation is available. Compare to corporate quarter earning reports, macroeconomic 
indicators such as weekly unemployment, monthly CPI are far more available. Hence 
analysts often look at these indicators and form their expectation of inflation.  
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 We have an interesting paradox here. Investors tend to look at most recent news 
or data to from expectations and act on these expectations, although in the long-run 
economy performs in a very different way. This is why more psychology often plays an 
important role in short-run market analysis. As discussed in Chapter 2, various biases 
appear in this process, we will come back to this in Chapter 5.  
After examining various factors in the short-run, we believe that the concern of 
inflation lies in the center of all expectations and hence has the most important impact. 
 
4.2. Responses from financial markets          
         It is a natural question to ask: how do various financial markets respond to these 
impacts? We will first analyze the response in terms of volatility and then qualitatively 
analyze each of the three financial markets: commodity, stock and foreign exchange. 
More detailed quantitative analyses follow in the next section. 
 As we analyzed in Chapter 2, investors make buy and sell decision based on 
various expectations they form. Since the inflation expectation lies in the center of a 
number of different expectations, it is by far a determining factor in the decision-making 
process. When inflation indicators change, people adjust their expectation accordingly 
and subsequently decide to buy or sell. For instance, various analysts blame the Fed for 
the increase market volatility this year. They attribute elevated variation to Feds 
continual increase of interest rates.  Hence it is certainly possible that financial markets 
will respond to inflation expectation as being more volatile. 
 As for the commodity market, we would expect oil price and gold price will be 
two most responsive prices. In general, when inflation expectation increases, commodity 
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price will increase because the same amount of currency unit can only buy less amount of 
a good now. In fact, the initial purpose of the commodity market is for business firms to 
hedge price risk and plan business budget ahead. More specifically, oil price and gold 
price are often considered benchmarks in the commodity market. Higher inflation 
expectation will make investors conscious of the paper money in hand. They will worry 
that their paper money will further depreciate and will be eager to convert their money to 
hard goods. This will push prices even higher. In a word, we expect the commodity 
market will respond positively to the inflation expectation. 
 The stock market is a little more complicated because companies often have more 
stories than commodities. The price of a companys stock subjects to more factors 
impact. Hence stocks response to inflation expectation may not be obvious if we focus 
on individual companies. Over the years, various market indices have been developed 
and have served as good representatives of the stock market. Among the earlier indices is 
the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) and it is still the most closely followed index 
today. Other indices such as Standard and Poors 500 and Russell 2000 are also common 
used. All indices are formed by assigning different weights for its components and 
display the aggregate move of a certain part of the market. For instance the DIJA is 
composed of the 30 biggest companies in America and the Russell 2000 represents 2000 
small companies in America. We expect most companies respond negatively to the 
inflation expectation because higher inflation generally means higher capital cost. 
 As for foreign exchange market, a higher domestic inflation expectation will 
make investors more inclined to sell dollar. Hence there will be a downward pressure on 
U.S. dollars. It is worth noting that the dollar price often moves oppositely with the gold, 
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since gold is often considered a hard currency. The relative value of dollar also depends 
on the supply and demand of other foreign currencies and prices of these currencies 
ultimately depend on inflation expectations outside the Unites States. 
 Given the data availability we will primarily analyze and compare the response in 
the stock market and commodity market in the next section.  
 
 
4.3 Regression Models and Conclusions 
 We obtained daily Sweet Crude oil price, Dow Jones Industrial Average and S&P 
500 Index from EODData[27] and Yahoo finance[28], respectively. We chose these three 
indicators to analyze the response from the financial markets because they are good 
representative for oil future and stock market. They are presented frequently during the 
day and as mentioned earlier and readily available from various media. Hence they are by 
far the most closely followed and most visible financial indicator.  
 I matched the data horizon with our 10 year inflation expectation percentage in 
Chapter 3. The source data are presented in Appendix 3. I conducted simple regression 
using each financial indicator as the Y variable and the inflation expectation as the X 
variable. The study will present and compare regression results for each of three 
indicators in this section. 
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Crude Sweet      
      
Regression Statistics     
Multiple R 0.622390436     
R Square 0.387369855     
Adjusted R 
Square 0.385031572     
Standard Error 4.191398757     
Observations 264     
      
ANOVA      
  df SS MS F 
Significance 
F 
Regression 1 2910.359977 2910.36 165.6642 
1.04408E-
29
Residual 262 4602.769768 17.56782   
Total 263 7513.129745       
      
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value  
Intercept -9.310055884 4.361627931 -2.13454 0.033727  
X Variable 1 23.30337305 1.810524529 12.87106 1.04E-29  
Table 4.1 Regression result for Sweet Crude oil price 
 As we can see from Table 4.1, the study achieved encouraging results for the 
regression between Sweet Crude oil and the inflation expectation. The significance level 
of our model is 1.044E-29, which allows us to be more than 99% confident that there 
exists a correlation between Sweet Crude oil price and the inflation expectation. The R 
square for our model is 0.387, which means that inflation expectation can explain 38.7% 
of the variation of Sweet Crude oil price. Given the complexity of financial world and 
simplicity of our model, the R square is satisfying. The correlation we obtained is: 
                   Sweet Crude oil price = 23.3*Inflation expectation - 9.31                       (4.10)    
The equation implies a positive correlation between the Sweet Crude oil price and the 
inflation expectation. This confirms our earlier analyses of contemporary concerns of 
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inflation in 3.1. The positive coefficient also corresponds to the proposition that investors 
follow inflation news closely to make decisions. 
 From the above result, it is evident that inflation expectation strongly interacts 
with the Sweet Crude oil price. More generally, since the Sweet Crude oil price to a large 
extent represents the oil future market, we believe that the oil market substantially 
interacts with inflation expectation. Media will certainly facilitate investors to respond to 
variations of inflation expectation trough the feedback process illustrated in Chapter 2. 
DJIA      
      
Regression Statistics     
Multiple R 0.530230945    
R Square 0.281144855    
Adjusted R Square 0.278401133    
Standard Error 233.4144984    
Observations 264    
      
ANOVA      
  df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 5582718.159 5582718 102.4684 1.52694E-20
Residual 262 14274369.95 54482.33  
Total 263 19857088.11      
      
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value  
Intercept 7888.912593 242.8943783 32.47878 7.54E-94 
X Variable 1 1020.629894 100.8261679 10.12267 1.53E-20 
 
Table 4.2 Regression result for Dow Jones Industrial Average 
 As for Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA), we also obtained encouraging 
results. The significance level is 1.53E-20, which means that we are more than 99% 
confident that our result is valid. Compared to the Sweet Crude oil price, the 0.281 R 
square is considerably lower. This can be justified by the fact that a public company is 
definitely far more complicated than the commodity oil. Composed of 30 biggest U.S. 
companies stock prices, it is by far the most followed stock index. It is often considered 
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a representative of the general stock market because its components are widely held by 
individuals in America through pension funds or mutual funds. It is highly sensitive to 
any corporate, politic or economic news. Hence inflation expectation can only explain 
28.1% of the variation of the DJIA index. In this regression we obtained the following 
correlation:  
                          DJIA= 1020.63*Inflation expectation + 7888.91 (4.11)   
 
S&P 500      
      
Regression Statistics     
Multiple R 0.781435276    
R Square 0.610641091    
Adjusted R Square 0.609154988    
Standard Error 25.5518094    
Observations 264    
      
ANOVA      
  df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 268275.1947 268275.2 410.901 1.3624E-55
Residual 262 171058.4805 652.895  
Total 263 439333.6752      
      
  Coefficients Standard Error T Stat P-value  
Intercept 1687.046881 26.58956879 63.4477 4.8E-161 
X Variable 1 -223.7359087 11.03740788 -20.2707 1.36E-55 
 
Table 4.3 Regression result for S&P 500 
 I also conducted similar regression for S&P 500 index. The significance of our 
model is 1.36E-55, which is the highest in three models. The R-square is surprisingly as 
high as 0.609, which means inflation expectation can explain 60.9% of the variation. In 
this regression we obtained the following equation: 
                         S&P 500 = -223.74*Inflation Expectation +1687.05,                        (4.12)   
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 Compared with the DJIA Index, S&P 500 includes 500 major public companies in 
the U.S., which is more representative of the overall stock market. Accordingly, we have 
a much higher significance level for S&P 500, because there are far less factors that could 
affect the 500 companies together. Furthermore, as mentioned in 4.1, since inflation 
expectation lies in the center of various economy-wide expectations, it explains a lot 
more variations of the S&P 500.It worth noting that the coefficients of inflation 
expectation in the DJIA model and the S&P 500 model have different signs. We believe 
that the negative coefficient in the S&P 500 model should be taken more seriously. This 
is because, for the general business world represented by S&P 500, a high inflation level 
is not healthy. The DJIA coefficient probably suggests that large U.S. companies are 
more robust to a high interest rate level than smaller companies. On the other hand, there 
are definitely days that S&P 500 and DJIA index does not move together.  In conclusion, 
we believe the stock market also interacts strongly with the inflation expectation. 
 While our findings are encouraging, there are several limitations in this study. 
First, the simple regression models we offer here are simplifications of the financial 
market. Second, the time frame of our analyses is from May 3, 2004 to May 20, 2005. 
During this period the inflation expectation has more variations because the constant 
increase of the interest rate. Using a data set of a different horizon may lead to different 
results.  
 In conclusion, the study finds that the financial markets do interact with the 
inflation expectation strongly. Through a feedback process, this interaction account for a 
major part of variations of financial markets. 
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Chapter 5 Implications and Future Possibilities 
 We have just finished our discussion of inflation expectation and financial 
markets. Where do we go from here? As we went through the feedback loop between 
News, Expectation and Markets, one thing repeatedly come to our mind: technology and 
its role in the feedback process. To fulfill the general goal of exploring the interaction 
between technology and society of an Interactive Qualifying Project, we will discuss the 
impact of technology 5.1. We will then raise questions for future study in 5.2 to complete 
this study. 
 
5.1 Advance in technology and market efficiency.  
 Since the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) was brought out, it has been widely 
debated and publicized. In a number of finance textbooks, the weak and semi-strong form 
of the EMH was supported. In simple form, the EMH states that all public available 
information and even inside information is already reflected in the market. Any pricing 
errors will cause only a temporary arbitrage position and the market is efficient enough to 
correct itself quickly. On the other hand, as we mentioned in 2.1, researches in behavioral 
finance have challenged the EMH during the past decade. As Burton Malkiel noted[29]: 
 Various economists including Lawrence Summers believe that 
efficient market theory doesnt work; psychology might play a role. 
Psychologists such as Daniel Kahneman believe that decisions are 
strongly affected by behavioral components. 
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 It is generally regarded that markets are less efficient in the short-run. However, 
advances in technology are changing the financial world. For instance, the number of 
trading and analyzing software multiplied during the past five years. Advance in 
computation technology and Internet made once professional and expensive tools widely 
available to ordinary investors. In addition, financial blogs, forums and educational 
websites have been increasingly popular. Non professional investors nowadays are no 
longer satisfied with TV analysts and newspaper columns. They aggressively seek 
information through various online resources. Furthermore, online trading and other 
electronic trading tools allow people to respond instantly to any change in the market. 
Investors can even obtain quotes from and trade on cell phones. After hour trading further 
empowers investors to respond to changes in other parts of the world and domestic 
changes after the closing bell. We believe these advances in technology that former 
investors can never imagine greatly improved market efficiency. 
A typical example of improved market efficiency is the disappearance of past 
trends. As Burton Malkiel noted: 
If the pattern is true, it is likely to self destruct as profit-maximizing 
investors seek to exploit it. Indeed, the more predictable any return 
predictability appears to be, the less likely it is to survive. 
Any regularity in the stock market that can be discovered and acted 
upon is bound to destroy itself.[30] 
 We believe market will be more and more efficient as advance in behavioral 
finance research continues to reveal patterns of investors decision process and 
technology help publicize them. This trend offers the following two implications. 
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First, dont take advertisement and news comments too seriously. Jackson Goss of 
Putnam Fund once said[31]: We dont sell funds; we sell dreams, such as security and 
college educations, with mutual funds as the way to realize those dreams. Similarly, a 
lot of companies and brokers sell a story or a concept rather than the real value of the 
asset. In addition, most stock analysts attribute market movement to latest economic 
indicators, as we often watch on television. However, most indicators are lagged data and 
subject to substantial revisions. Second, dont get into short-term speculation unless one 
thinks one can beat sophisticated analysts.  In his book, The Great Crash, John Galbraith 
observes[32], Speculation on a large scale requires a persuasive sense of confidence and 
optimism and con conviction that ordinary people were meant to be rich. This 
implication goes back to our quote of Mark Twain in Chapter 1.  
 
5.2 Future possibilities 
 Keynes said in his famous book The General Theory that In the long run we are 
all dead. The debate between short-run and long-run behaviors of economics has never 
stopped. As this study found that peoples short-run performance is affected by their 
long-run expectation, we wonder how we can differentiate short-run and long-run market. 
With the increasing popularity of low-cost index funds, we wonder if that will make 
market more efficient. In addition invest by index funds essentially distribute capital 
more equally. This seems to contradict financial markets function of channeling money 
and allocate scarce resources optimally. With a curious mind, we end our study here, 
leaving a series of questions that inspire and challenge future researchers to answer. 
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Appendix 1.  Daily Yield Rates, Expected Inflation Rate and its Percent Change 
                     (Data from U.S. Treasury are in bold; Fed rate increase days are in bold) 
Date 10 yr TIPS 
10 yr 
T-
Notes 
Pi_10 
year 
10 year Pi Daily 
Percent Change 
5/3/2004 2.09% 4.53 2.167464 0.182908  
5/4/2004 2.10% 4.56 2.171429 1.096491  
5/5/2004 2.10% 4.61 2.195238 -1.90183  
5/6/2004 2.15% 4.63 2.153488 -0.70098  
5/7/2004 2.24% 4.79 2.138393 -0.02876  
5/10/2004 2.25% 4.81 2.137778 1.386629  
5/11/2004 2.21% 4.79 2.167421 2.693784  
5/12/2004 2.17% 4.83 2.225806 -0.04654  
5/13/2004 2.18% 4.85 2.224771 -0.32264  
5/14/2004 2.16% 4.79 2.217593 2.38722  
5/17/2004 2.07% 4.7 2.270531 1.834977  
5/18/2004 2.05% 4.74 2.312195 2.050467  
5/19/2004 2.03% 4.79 2.359606 2.057859  
5/20/2004 1.96% 4.72 2.408163 -3.10734  
5/21/2004 2.04% 4.76 2.333333 1.279318  
5/24/2004 2.01% 4.75 2.363184 -1.40213  
5/25/2004 2.03% 4.73 2.330049 0.716054  
5/26/2004 1.99% 4.67 2.346734 -0.49892  
5/27/2004 1.97% 4.6 2.335025 -0.21522  
5/28/2004 2.00% 4.66 2.33 2.612144  
6/1/2004 1.97% 4.71 2.390863 -2.81629  
6/2/2004 2.04% 4.74 2.323529 -1.11763  
6/3/2004 2.05% 4.71 2.297561 -1.39966  
6/4/2004 2.11% 4.78 2.265403 0  
6/7/2004 2.11% 4.78 2.265403 -1.86047  
6/8/2004 2.15% 4.78 2.223256 -1.45493  
6/9/2004 2.20% 4.82 2.190909 0.708059  
6/10/2004 2.18% 4.81 2.206422 -1.9355  
6/14/2004 2.26% 4.89 2.163717 0.350299  
6/15/2004 2.16% 4.69 2.171296 0.138886  
6/16/2004 2.18% 4.74 2.174312 0.287154  
6/17/2004 2.16% 4.71 2.180556 0.678418  
6/18/2004 2.15% 4.72 2.195349 -0.88473  
6/21/2004 2.16% 4.7 2.175926 -0.03726  
6/22/2004 2.17% 4.72 2.175115 -0.66961  
6/23/2004 2.18% 4.71 2.16055 0.318965  
6/24/2004 2.15% 4.66 2.167442 -0.46296  
6/25/2004 2.16% 4.66 2.157407 -1.06045  
6/28/2004 2.23% 4.76 2.134529 0.085943  
6/29/2004 2.20% 4.7 2.136364 2.978723  
6/30/2004 2.10% 4.62 2.2 1.827094  
7/1/2004 2.04% 4.57 2.240196 2.031885  
Date 10 yr TIPS 
10 yr 
T-
Notes 
Pi_10 
year 
10 year Pi Daily 
Percent Change  
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7/6/2004 1.97% 4.49 2.279188 -1.28062  
7/7/2004 2.00% 4.5 2.25 -1.21012  
7/8/2004 2.02% 4.49 2.222772 0  
7/9/2004 2.02% 4.49 2.222772 -0.66815  
7/12/2004 2.02% 4.46 2.207921 0.399832  
7/13/2004 2.03% 4.5 2.216749 0.49505  
7/14/2004 2.02% 4.5 2.227723 0.497512  
7/15/2004 2.01% 4.5 2.238806 0.845361  
7/16/2004 1.94% 4.38 2.257732 -1.02041  
7/19/2004 1.96% 4.38 2.234694 -2.42566  
7/20/2004 2.05% 4.47 2.180488 0.671141  
7/21/2004 2.05% 4.5 2.195122 0.536398  
7/22/2004 2.03% 4.48 2.206897 0.820312  
7/23/2004 2.00% 4.45 2.225 -1.56207  
7/26/2004 2.05% 4.49 2.190244 -1.89051  
7/27/2004 2.15% 4.62 2.148837 1.675181  
7/28/2004 2.11% 4.61 2.184834 1.711256  
7/29/2004 2.07% 4.6 2.222222 0.746269  
7/30/2004 2.01% 4.5 2.238806 0.053333  
8/2/2004 2.00% 4.48 2.24 0.333694  
8/3/2004 1.98% 4.45 2.247475 -1  
8/4/2004 2.00% 4.45 2.225 1.582206  
8/5/2004 1.96% 4.43 2.260204 3.07345  
8/6/2004 1.82% 4.24 2.32967 -0.69352  
8/9/2004 1.85% 4.28 2.313514 -1.72159  
8/10/2004 1.90% 4.32 2.273684 1.677618  
8/11/2004 1.86% 4.3 2.311828 2.045484  
8/12/2004 1.81% 4.27 2.359116 1.062464  
8/13/2004 1.77% 4.22 2.384181 -1.82543  
8/16/2004 1.82% 4.26 2.340659 -1.17371  
8/17/2004 1.82% 4.21 2.313187 -0.07398  
8/18/2004 1.83% 4.23 2.311475 3.731464  
8/19/2004 1.76% 4.22 2.397727 -1.20999  
8/20/2004 1.79% 4.24 2.368715 -2.85555  
8/23/2004 1.86% 4.28 2.301075 -0.53476  
8/24/2004 1.87% 4.28 2.28877 -0.99672  
8/25/2004 1.88% 4.26 2.265957 0.126205  
8/26/2004 1.86% 4.22 2.268817 0.236967  
8/27/2004 1.86% 4.23 2.274194 0.678216  
8/30/2004 1.83% 4.19 2.289617 1.336784  
8/31/2004 1.78% 4.13 2.320225 0.564972  
9/1/2004 1.77% 4.13 2.333333 -1.63934  
9/2/2004 1.83% 4.2 2.295082 -0.34195  
9/3/2004 1.88% 4.3 2.287234 0.135034  
9/7/2004 1.86% 4.26 2.290323 0.278595  
9/8/2004 1.82% 4.18 2.296703 0.405261  
9/9/2004 1.83% 4.22 2.306011 -0.7109  
9/10/2004 1.83% 4.19 2.289617 0.38107  
Date 10 yr TIPS 
10 yr 
T-
Notes 
Pi_10 
year 
10 year Pi Daily 
Percent Change  
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9/14/2004 1.81% 4.15 2.292818 -1.98471  
9/15/2004 1.86% 4.18 2.247312 0.304  
9/16/2004 1.81% 4.08 2.254144 -0.72337  
9/17/2004 1.85% 4.14 2.237838 1.039989  
9/20/2004 1.80% 4.07 2.261111 -0.4914  
9/21/2004 1.80% 4.05 2.25 2.761721  
9/22/2004 1.73% 4 2.312139 -1.21307  
9/23/2004 1.76% 4.02 2.284091 -0.63167  
9/24/2004 1.78% 4.04 2.269663 2.719894  
9/27/2004 1.72% 4.01 2.331395 1.428781  
9/28/2004 1.70% 4.02 2.364706 -1.48688  
9/29/2004 1.76% 4.1 2.329545 0.405126  
9/30/2004 1.77% 4.14 2.338983 -1.6433  
10/1/2004 1.83% 4.21 2.300546 -2.0803  
10/4/2004 1.86% 4.19 2.252688 0.845699  
10/5/2004 1.84% 4.18 2.271739 -1.9995  
10/6/2004 1.90% 4.23 2.226316 1.242073  
10/7/2004 1.89% 4.26 2.253968 3.438044  
10/8/2004 1.78% 4.15 2.331461 0.979002  
10/12/2004 1.75% 4.12 2.354286 1.00333  
10/13/2004 1.72% 4.09 2.377907 0.879031  
10/14/2004 1.68% 4.03 2.39881 -0.19559  
10/15/2004 1.70% 4.07 2.394118 -0.5848  
10/18/2004 1.71% 4.07 2.380117 0.588235  
10/19/2004 1.70% 4.07 2.394118 0.899914  
10/20/2004 1.66% 4.01 2.415663 2.469136  
10/21/2004 1.62% 4.01 2.475309 -1.46585  
10/22/2004 1.64% 4 2.439024 0.361963  
10/25/2004 1.63% 3.99 2.447853 0.501253  
10/26/2004 1.63% 4.01 2.460123 -3.43073  
10/27/2004 1.73% 4.11 2.375723 2.47509  
10/28/2004 1.68% 4.09 2.434524 2.05949  
10/29/2004 1.63% 4.05 2.484663 -0.94921  
11/1/2004 1.67% 4.11 2.461078 3.474332  
11/2/2004 1.61% 4.1 2.546584 -0.2439  
11/3/2004 1.61% 4.09 2.540373 -2.18567  
11/4/2004 1.65% 4.1 2.484848 -0.91998  
11/5/2004 1.71% 4.21 2.461988 -0.34525  
11/8/2004 1.72% 4.22 2.453488 -1.14943  
11/9/2004 1.74% 4.22 2.425287 0.13541  
11/10/2004 1.75% 4.25 2.428571 1.135191  
11/12/2004 1.71% 4.2 2.45614 2.39521  
11/15/2004 1.67% 4.2 2.51497 -0.35856  
11/16/2004 1.68% 4.21 2.505952 1.353774  
11/17/2004 1.63% 4.14 2.539877 -1.0899  
11/18/2004 1.64% 4.12 2.512195 0.110459  
11/19/2004 1.67% 4.2 2.51497 2.595532  
11/22/2004 1.62% 4.18 2.580247 -1.5833  
Date 10 yr TIPS 
10 yr 
T-
Notes 
Pi_10 
year 
10 year Pi Daily 
Percent Change  
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11/24/2004 1.64% 4.2 2.560976 -0.26391  
11/26/2004 1.66% 4.24 2.554217 -2.34765  
11/29/2004 1.74% 4.34 2.494253 -0.11323  
11/30/2004 1.75% 4.36 2.491429 -1.78617  
12/1/2004 1.79% 4.38 2.446927 -1.73915  
12/2/2004 1.83% 4.4 2.404372 2.655018  
12/3/2004 1.73% 4.27 2.468208 1.049731  
12/6/2004 1.70% 4.24 2.494118 0.354471  
12/7/2004 1.69% 4.23 2.502959 2.101392  
12/8/2004 1.62% 4.14 2.555556 -0.02651  
12/9/2004 1.64% 4.19 2.554878 -1.91218  
12/10/2004 1.66% 4.16 2.506024 0.606061  
12/13/2004 1.65% 4.16 2.521212 1.362179  
12/14/2004 1.62% 4.14 2.555556 1.938521  
12/15/2004 1.57% 4.09 2.605096 -1.92766  
12/16/2004 1.64% 4.19 2.554878 0.477327  
12/17/2004 1.64% 4.21 2.567073 1.234568  
12/20/2004 1.62% 4.21 2.598765 1.160758  
12/21/2004 1.59% 4.18 2.628931 -1.7539  
12/22/2004 1.63% 4.21 2.582822 1.095276  
12/23/2004 1.62% 4.23 2.611111 -1.38871  
12/27/2004 1.67% 4.3 2.57485 -0.95363  
12/28/2004 1.69% 4.31 2.550296 -1.85883  
12/29/2004 1.73% 4.33 2.50289 0.354571  
12/30/2004 1.70% 4.27 2.511765 0.479536  
12/31/2004 1.68% 4.24 2.52381 -1.40954  
1/3/2005 1.70% 4.23 2.488235 -3.13969  
1/4/2005 1.78% 4.29 2.410112 -0.55866  
1/5/2005 1.79% 4.29 2.396648 1.704545  
1/6/2005 1.76% 4.29 2.4375 -2.22222  
1/7/2005 1.80% 4.29 2.383333 1.694915  
1/10/2005 1.77% 4.29 2.423729 -0.13509  
1/11/2005 1.76% 4.26 2.420455 1.495292  
1/12/2005 1.73% 4.25 2.456647 0.567474  
1/13/2005 1.70% 4.2 2.470588 -0.45681  
1/14/2005 1.72% 4.23 2.459302 0.109217  
1/18/2005 1.71% 4.21 2.461988 0.349308  
1/19/2005 1.70% 4.2 2.470588 -0.71429  
1/20/2005 1.70% 4.17 2.452941 0.350489  
1/21/2005 1.69% 4.16 2.461538 0.111607  
1/24/2005 1.68% 4.14 2.464286 -2.04898  
1/25/2005 1.74% 4.2 2.413793 1.403654  
1/26/2005 1.72% 4.21 2.447674 0.23753  
1/27/2005 1.72% 4.22 2.453488 2.760304  
1/28/2005 1.65% 4.16 2.521212 -0.48077  
1/31/2005 1.65% 4.14 2.509091 -0.95895  
2/1/2005 1.67% 4.15 2.48503 -1.76471  
2/2/2005 1.70% 4.15 2.441176 -1.02375  
Date 10 yr TIPS 
10 yr 
T-
Notes 
Pi_10 
year 
10 year Pi Daily 
Percent Change  
 64
2/4/2005 1.65% 4.09 2.478788 1.353799  
2/7/2005 1.62% 4.07 2.512346 2.677663  
2/8/2005 1.57% 4.05 2.579618 4.068274  
2/9/2005 1.49% 4 2.684564 -3.43471  
2/10/2005 1.57% 4.07 2.592357 0.737101  
2/11/2005 1.57% 4.1 2.611465 1.450744  
2/14/2005 1.54% 4.08 2.649351 -3.87894  
2/15/2005 1.61% 4.1 2.546584 -0.9963  
2/16/2005 1.65% 4.16 2.521212 0.721154  
2/17/2005 1.65% 4.19 2.539394 0.688837  
2/18/2005 1.67% 4.27 2.556886 0.468384  
2/22/2005 1.67% 4.29 2.568862 1.35454  
2/23/2005 1.64% 4.27 2.603659 -0.14052  
2/24/2005 1.65% 4.29 2.6 0.140713  
2/25/2005 1.64% 4.27 2.603659 -1.49607  
2/28/2005 1.70% 4.36 2.564706 1.053146  
3/1/2005 1.69% 4.38 2.591716 0  
3/2/2005 1.69% 4.38 2.591716 0.228311  
3/3/2005 1.69% 4.39 2.597633 0.791054  
3/4/2005 1.65% 4.32 2.618182 0.992672  
3/7/2005 1.63% 4.31 2.644172 -0.80998  
3/8/2005 1.67% 4.38 2.622754 -2.63396  
3/9/2005 1.77% 4.52 2.553672 -0.3218  
3/10/2005 1.76% 4.48 2.545455 -1.56986  
3/11/2005 1.82% 4.56 2.505495 -0.87719  
3/14/2005 1.82% 4.52 2.483516 0.442478  
3/15/2005 1.82% 4.54 2.494505 1.228066  
3/16/2005 1.79% 4.52 2.52514 2.323648  
3/17/2005 1.73% 4.47 2.583815 -1.38526  
3/18/2005 1.77% 4.51 2.548023 -1.2306  
3/21/2005 1.80% 4.53 2.516667 -1.61844  
3/22/2005 1.87% 4.63 2.475936 -3.02488  
3/23/2005 1.92% 4.61 2.401042 0.833428  
3/24/2005 1.90% 4.6 2.421053 -1.21022  
3/28/2005 1.94% 4.64 2.391753 0.695071  
3/29/2005 1.91% 4.6 2.408377 0.179434  
3/30/2005 1.89% 4.56 2.412698 4.197295  
3/31/2005 1.79% 4.5 2.513966 0.231011  
4/1/2005 1.77% 4.46 2.519774 -0.89561  
4/4/2005 1.79% 4.47 2.497207 -0.88373  
4/5/2005 1.81% 4.48 2.475138 -0.34226  
4/6/2005 1.80% 4.44 2.466667 -1.60701  
4/7/2005 1.85% 4.49 2.427027 0.767406  
4/8/2005 1.84% 4.5 2.445652 -0.02442  
4/11/2005 1.82% 4.45 2.445055 3.547444  
4/12/2005 1.73% 4.38 2.531792 -0.57471  
4/13/2005 1.74% 4.38 2.517241 0.931825  
4/14/2005 1.72% 4.37 2.540698 0.63717  
Date 10 yr TIPS 
10 yr 
T-
Notes 
Pi_10 
year 
10 year Pi Daily 
Percent Change  
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4/18/2005 1.66% 4.27 2.572289 1.029288  
4/19/2005 1.62% 4.21 2.598765 1.490499  
4/20/2005 1.60% 4.22 2.6375 -1.33044  
4/21/2005 1.66% 4.32 2.60241 1.673568  
4/22/2005 1.61% 4.26 2.645963 -1.22699  
4/25/2005 1.63% 4.26 2.613497 -1.34623  
4/26/2005 1.66% 4.28 2.578313 -0.09912  
4/27/2005 1.65% 4.25 2.575758 2.956069  
4/28/2005 1.58% 4.19 2.651899 -1.39492  
4/29/2005 1.61% 4.21 2.614907 0  
5/2/2005 1.61% 4.21 2.614907 -1.82927  
5/3/2005 1.64% 4.21 2.567073 0.37451  
5/4/2005 1.63% 4.2 2.576687 0.377719  
5/5/2005 1.62% 4.19 2.58642 -2.08301  
5/6/2005 1.69% 4.28 2.532544 0.233645  
5/9/2005 1.69% 4.29 2.538462 0.991736  
5/10/2005 1.65% 4.23 2.563636 0.13406  
5/11/2005 1.64% 4.21 2.567073 -1.90882  
5/12/2005 1.66% 4.18 2.518072 -1.43541  
5/13/2005 1.66% 4.12 2.481928 0.242718  
5/16/2005 1.66% 4.13 2.487952 0.974429  
5/17/2005 1.64% 4.12 2.512195 -1.8123  
5/18/2005 1.65% 4.07 2.466667 -1.40732  
5/19/2005 1.69% 4.11 2.431953 1.690051  
5/20/2005 1.67% 4.13 2.473054   
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Appendix 2.  Selected news on days with dramatic changes 
Date News Change Source 
 
05/21/2004 
 
 
 
U.S. stocks headed higher at Friday's 
open as tame inflation comments from a 
Federal Reserve official helped lower 
bond yields and crude prices, and lift 
investor spirits. 
 
 
 
 
 
-3.107344 
 
 
 
AFX News 
Limited 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10/8/2004 
 
Federal Reserve Governor Ben 
Bernanke is speaking up again, and it 
may not be a coincidence that oil prices 
also keep rising. Mr. Bernanke 
suggested yesterday that softer 
economic growth could trigger a pause 
in the Fed's determination to end its easy 
money policy. 
 
Commodities like oil are the canary in 
the coal mine of future inflation. Oil in 
particular has an inelastic supply curve, 
as economists put it, meaning that as 
demand surges in a growing world 
economy, the price tends to surge with 
it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.438043994 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Wall 
Street 
Journal 
 
 
10/27/2004 
The main US equity indices were lower 
in early trade on Wednesday as the 
onslaught of quarterly earnings 
continued while the oil price hovered 
around the $ 55 per barrel mark and 
economic data disappointed 
expectations. 
 
 
 
 
-3.43072954 
 
 
 
 
AFX News 
Limited   
 
 
 
1/4/2005 
 
 
 
 
 
The FOMC was roughly split into two 
camps on the outlook for inflation at 
their closed-door meeting on Dec. 14. 
 
Although the faction that insists that 
inflation is under control won out at the 
December meeting, the minutes showed 
a number of the U.S. central bankers on 
the committee were growing worried 
that the weaker dollar, higher energy  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-3.13969241 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AFX News 
Limited  
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1/4/2005 
 
 
prices and a slowdown in productivity 
growth could lead to higher prices. 
 
 
 
-3.13969241 
 
 
 
 
AFX News 
Limited    
 
 
 
2/10/2005 
 
The U.S. economy is on a solid growth 
path with no sign of an uptick in 
inflation, said Gary Stern, the president 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Minneapolis. "I just don't see the signs - 
the ingredients- that would perhaps 
contribute to higher inflation. 
"There may be a few things around the 
edges that are worth worrying about if 
you really want to, but the 
preponderance of evidence suggests that 
inflation is going to stay modest," Stern 
said. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-3.43471338 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AFX News 
Limited   
 
 
 
 
3/31/2005 
 
The bond market has been especially 
nervous about accelerated inflation since 
the Federal Reserve made hawkish 
comments on the subject last week. 
Inflation erodes the value of fixed-
income instruments. 
 
The core deflator's year-over-year rate of 
increase remained steady at 1.6 percent. 
 
However, the rate of increase in the 
months of December, January and 
February now equates to 1.8 percent, 
which in fact would show acceleration, 
according to Ian Shepherdson, Chief 
U.S. Economist at High Frequency 
Economics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.197294913 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AFX News 
Limited 
 
 
 
 
4/12/2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Many members said that circumstances 
had changed dramatically from their 
previous meeting in late January, with 
signs of a stronger economy than 
previously perceived and risks that 
inflation pressures could be intensifying.
 
'While underlying inflation appeared to 
have moved up only modestly, and 
nearly all participants thought that core 
and total inflation going forward would 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.547444307 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AFX News 
Limited  
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4/12/2005 
 
be relatively low, they had become less 
certain of that outlook for the next few 
quarters,' according to the minutes. 
 
 
3.547444307 
 
 
AFX News 
Limited 
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Appendix 3.  Daily Sweet Oil Price, S&P 500 and Dow Jones Industrial Average 
Index 
(Data from EODData are in bold) 
Date Dow Adj.
S&P 
Adj Sweet 
Pi_10 
year 
5/3/2004 10314 1189.28 38.21  
5/4/2004 10317.2 1191.08 38.98 2.167464
5/5/2004 10310.95 1185.56 39.57 2.171429
5/6/2004 10241.26 1173.8 39.37 2.195238
5/7/2004 10117.34 1165.69 39.93 2.153488
5/10/2004 9990.02 1154.05 38.93 2.138393
5/11/2004 10019.47 1159.36 40.06 2.137778
5/12/2004 10045.16 1171.11 40.77 2.167421
5/13/2004 10010.74 1166.22 41.08 2.225806
5/14/2004 10012.87 1178.84 41.38 2.224771
5/17/2004 9906.91 1171.35 41.55 2.217593
5/18/2004 9968.51 1172.63 40.42 2.270531
5/19/2004 9937.71 1175.65 41.52 2.312195
5/20/2004 9937.64 1161.17 40.8 2.359606
5/21/2004 9966.74 1162.16 39.93 2.408163
5/24/2004 9958.43 1156.85 41.72 2.333333
5/25/2004 10117.62 1143.22 41.14 2.363184
5/26/2004 10109.89 1156.38 40.7 2.330049
5/27/2004 10205.2 1151.83 39.44 2.346734
5/28/2004 10188.45 1162.1 39.88 2.335025
6/1/2004 10202.65 1152.12 42.33 2.33 
6/2/2004 10262.97 1159.95 39.96 2.390863
6/3/2004 10195.91 1137.5 39.28 2.323529
6/4/2004 10242.82 1152.78 38.49 2.297561
6/7/2004 10391.08 1145.98 38.66 2.265403
6/8/2004 10432.52 1142.62 37.28 2.265403
6/9/2004 10368.44 1162.05 37.54 2.223256
6/10/2004 10410.1 1173.79 38.45 2.190909
6/14/2004 10334.73 1187.76 37.88 2.206422
6/15/2004 10380.43 1181.21 37.42 2.163717
6/16/2004 10379.58 1181.2 37.65 2.171296
6/17/2004 10377.52 1191.14 38.81 2.174312
6/18/2004 10416.41 1184.07 39 2.180556
6/21/2004 10371.47 1181.39 37.77 2.195349
6/22/2004 10395.07 1176.12 38.25 2.175926
6/23/2004 10479.57 1172.92 37.57 2.175115
6/24/2004 10443.81 1180.59 37.93 2.16055 
6/25/2004 10371.84 1181.41 37.55 2.167442
6/28/2004 10357.09 1165.36 36.24 2.157407
6/29/2004 10413.43 1174.28 35.66 2.134529
6/30/2004 10435.48 1171.42 37.05 2.136364
7/1/2004 10334.16 1172.53 38.74 2.2 
 70
7/2/2004 10282.83 1171.71 38.39 2.240196
7/6/2004 10219.34 1183.78 39.65 2.285714
7/7/2004 10240.29 1189.65 39.08 2.279188
7/8/2004 10171.56 1190.21 40.33 2.25 
7/9/2004 10213.22 1188.07 39.96 2.222772
7/12/2004 10238.22 1197.75 39.5 2.222772
7/13/2004 10247.59 1206.83 39.44 2.207921
7/14/2004 10208.8 1200.08 40.97 2.216749
7/15/2004 10163.16 1209.25 40.77 2.227723
7/16/2004 10139.78 1207.01 41.25 2.238806
7/19/2004 10094.06 1219.43 41.44 2.257732
7/20/2004 10149.07 1225.31 40.44 2.234694
7/21/2004 10046.13 1222.12 40.58 2.180488
7/22/2004 10050.33 1210.47 41.36 2.195122
7/23/2004 9962.22 1210.08 41.71 2.206897
7/26/2004 9961.92 1210.41 41.44 2.225 
7/27/2004 10085.14 1203.6 41.84 2.190244
7/28/2004 10117.07 1211.37 42.9 2.148837
7/29/2004 10129.24 1200.2 42.75 2.184834
7/30/2004 10139.71 1190.8 43.8 2.222222
8/2/2004 10179.16 1184.16 43.82 2.238806
8/3/2004 10120.24 1201.59 44.15 2.24 
8/4/2004 10126.51 1200.75 42.83 2.247475
8/5/2004 9963.03 1210.34 44.41 2.225 
8/6/2004 9815.33 1210.12 43.95 2.260204
8/9/2004 9814.66 1206.14 44.84 2.32967 
8/10/2004 9944.67 1205.3 44.52 2.313514
8/11/2004 9938.32 1197.01 44.8 2.273684
8/12/2004 9814.59 1191.99 45.5 2.311828
8/13/2004 9825.35 1202.3 46.58 2.359116
8/16/2004 9954.55 1201.72 46.05 2.384181
8/17/2004 9972.83 1203.03 46.75 2.340659
8/18/2004 10083.15 1189.89 47.27 2.313187
8/19/2004 10040.82 1193.19 48.7 2.311475
8/20/2004 10110.14 1189.41 46.72 2.397727
8/23/2004 10073.05 1181.27 46.05 2.368715
8/24/2004 10098.63 1171.36 45.21 2.301075
8/25/2004 10181.74 1174.55 43.47 2.28877 
8/26/2004 10173.41 1174.07 43.1 2.265957
8/27/2004 10195.01 1168.41 43.18 2.268817
8/30/2004 10122.52 1163.75 42.28 2.274194
8/31/2004 10173.92 1167.87 42.12 2.289617
9/1/2004 10168.46 1175.41 44 2.320225
9/2/2004 10290.28 1184.63 44.06 2.333333
9/3/2004 10260.2 1195.98 43.99 2.295082
9/7/2004 10341.16 1184.52 43.31 2.287234
9/8/2004 10313.36 1177.45 42.77 2.290323
9/9/2004 10289.1 1187.7 44.61 2.296703
9/10/2004 10313.07 1182.99 42.81 2.306011
9/13/2004 10314.76 1190.25 43.87 2.289617
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9/14/2004 10318.16 1186.19 44.39 2.298343
9/15/2004 10231.36 1187.89 43.58 2.292818
9/16/2004 10244.49 1183.74 43.88 2.247312
9/17/2004 10284.46 1188.05 45.59 2.254144
9/20/2004 10204.89 1202.08 46.35 2.237838
9/21/2004 10244.93 1211.92 46.76 2.261111
9/22/2004 10109.18 1213.55 48.35 2.25 
9/23/2004 10038.9 1213.45 48.46 2.312139
9/24/2004 10047.24 1213.54 48.88 2.284091
9/27/2004 9988.54 1204.92 49.64 2.269663
9/28/2004 10077.4 1210.13 49.9 2.331395
9/29/2004 10136.24 1209.57 49.51 2.364706
9/30/2004 10080.27 1205.45 49.64 2.329545
10/1/2004 10192.65 1194.65 50.12 2.338983
10/4/2004 10216.54 1194.2 49.91 2.300546
10/5/2004 10177.68 1203.21 51.09 2.252688
10/6/2004 10239.92 1205.72 52.02 2.271739
10/7/2004 10125.4 1203.38 52.67 2.226316
10/8/2004 10055.2 1198.68 53.31 2.253968
10/11/2004 10081.97 1188 53.64 2.331461
10/12/2004 10077.18 1189.24 52.51 2.354286
10/13/2004 10002.33 1182.81 53.64 2.377907
10/14/2004 9894.45 1177.07 54.76 2.39881 
10/15/2004 9933.38 1190.25 54.93 2.394118
10/18/2004 9956.32 1191.17 53.67 2.380117
10/19/2004 9897.62 1190.33 53.29 2.394118
10/20/2004 9886.93 1191.37 54.41 2.415663
10/21/2004 9865.76 1173.82 54.47 2.475309
10/22/2004 9757.81 1178.57 55.17 2.439024
10/25/2004 9749.99 1182.65 54.54 2.447853
10/26/2004 9888.48 1181.76 55.17 2.460123
10/27/2004 10002.03 1176.94 52.46 2.375723
10/28/2004 10004.54 1177.24 50.92 2.434524
10/29/2004 10027.47 1170.34 51.76 2.484663
11/1/2004 10054.39 1183.55 50.13 2.461078
11/2/2004 10035.73 1181.94 49.62 2.546584
11/3/2004 10137.05 1175.43 50.88 2.540373
11/4/2004 10314.76 1183.81 48.82 2.484848
11/5/2004 10387.54 1184.17 49.61 2.461988
11/8/2004 10391.31 1173.48 49.09 2.453488
11/9/2004 10386.37 1162.91 47.37 2.425287
11/10/2004 10385.48 1164.08 48.86 2.428571
11/11/2004 10469.84 1164.89 47.42 2.45614 
11/12/2004 10539.01 1166.17 47.32 2.51497 
11/15/2004 10550.24 1161.67 46.77 2.505952
11/16/2004 10487.65 1143.2 45.99 2.539877
11/17/2004 10549.57 1130.56 46.82 2.512195
11/18/2004 10572.55 1130.51 46.42 2.51497 
11/19/2004 10456.91 1130.2 48.8 2.580247
11/22/2004 10489.42 1127.44 48.33 2.539394
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11/23/2004 10492.6 1125.4 48.89 2.560976
11/24/2004 10520.31 1111.09 48.6 2.554217
11/26/2004 10522.23 1094.8 49.73 2.494253
11/29/2004 10475.9 1095.74 48.98 2.491429
11/30/2004 10428.02 1106.49 45.59 2.446927
12/1/2004 10590.22 1103.66 43.31 2.404372
12/2/2004 10585.12 1103.23 42.54 2.468208
12/3/2004 10592.21 1114.02 43.05 2.494118
12/6/2004 10547.06 1108.2 41.54 2.502959
12/7/2004 10440.58 1103.29 42.15 2.555556
12/8/2004 10494.23 1113.65 42.38 2.554878
12/9/2004 10552.82 1121.84 40.71 2.506024
12/10/2004 10543.22 1124.39 41.32 2.521212
12/13/2004 10638.32 1122.14 42.04 2.555556
12/14/2004 10676.45 1130.65 44.41 2.605096
12/15/2004 10691.45 1142.05 44.45 2.554878
12/16/2004 10705.64 1134.48 46.28 2.567073
12/17/2004 10649.92 1135.17 45.75 2.598765
12/20/2004 10661.6 1131.5 45.63 2.628931
12/21/2004 10759.43 1114.58 44.1 2.582822
12/22/2004 10815.89 1114.8 44.18 2.611111
12/23/2004 10827.12 1110.06 41.48 2.57485 
12/27/2004 10776.13 1103.52 41.92 2.550296
12/28/2004 10854.54 1110.11 43.44 2.50289 
12/29/2004 10829.19 1108.36 43.45 2.511765
12/30/2004 10800.3 1113.56 42.28 2.52381 
12/31/2004 10783.01 1129.3 43.73 2.488235
1/3/2005 10729.43 1122.2 43.3 2.410112
1/4/2005 10630.78 1128.55 45.45 2.396648
1/5/2005 10597.83 1123.5 45.43 2.4375 
1/6/2005 10622.88 1120.37 45.32 2.383333
1/7/2005 10603.96 1128.33 45.9 2.423729
1/10/2005 10621.03 1125.82 46.64 2.420455
1/11/2005 10556.22 1123.92 48 2.456647
1/12/2005 10617.78 1118.38 48.38 2.470588
1/13/2005 10505.83 1116.27 49.11 2.459302
1/14/2005 10558 1121.3 48.31 2.461988
1/18/2005 10628.79 1113.63 47.17 2.470588
1/19/2005 10539.97 1118.31 47.4 2.452941
1/20/2005 10471.47 1105.91 48.53 2.461538
1/21/2005 10392.99 1104.24 48.61 2.464286
1/24/2005 10368.61 1099.15 49.43 2.413793
1/25/2005 10461.56 1107.77 48.91 2.447674
1/26/2005 10498.59 1105.09 48.72 2.453488
1/27/2005 10467.4 1104.96 47.18 2.521212
1/28/2005 10427.2 1096.19 48 2.509091
1/31/2005 10489.94 1095.68 47.03 2.48503 
2/1/2005 10551.94 1098.35 46.69 2.441176
2/2/2005 10596.79 1091.23 46.65 2.416185
2/3/2005 10593.1 1095.17 46.48 2.478788
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2/4/2005 10716.13 1081.71 45.18 2.512346
2/7/2005 10715.76 1079.34 45.17 2.579618
2/8/2005 10724.63 1064.8 45.56 2.684564
2/9/2005 10664.11 1063.23 46.99 2.592357
2/10/2005 10749.61 1075.79 47.16 2.611465
2/11/2005 10796.01 1079.04 47.42 2.649351
2/14/2005 10791.13 1065.22 47.42 2.546584
2/15/2005 10837.32 1063.97 48.46 2.521212
2/16/2005 10834.88 1080.7 48.36 2.539394
2/17/2005 10754.26 1098.63 49.01 2.556886
2/18/2005 10785.22 1099.69 49.32 2.568862
2/22/2005 10611.2 1106.62 51.35 2.603659
2/23/2005 10673.79 1101.72 51.39 2.6 
2/24/2005 10748.79 1100.43 51.24 2.603659
2/25/2005 10841.6 1095.42 51.49 2.564706
2/28/2005 10766.23 1094.83 51.72 2.591716
3/1/2005 10830 1084.07 51.61 2.591716
3/2/2005 10811.97 1086.2 53 2.597633
3/3/2005 10833.03 1096.84 53.46 2.618182
3/4/2005 10940.55 1093.88 53.78 2.644172
3/7/2005 10936.86 1108.67 53.54 2.622754
3/8/2005 10912.62 1100.9 54.89 2.553672
3/9/2005 10805.62 1101.39 54.29 2.545455
3/10/2005 10851.51 1106.69 53.14 2.505495
3/11/2005 10774.36 1111.47 54.43 2.483516
3/14/2005 10804.51 1115.14 55.02 2.494505
3/15/2005 10745.1 1114.35 54.71 2.52514 
3/16/2005 10633.07 1112.81 56.59 2.583815
3/17/2005 10626.35 1109.11 56.3 2.548023
3/18/2005 10629.67 1118.33 56.72 2.516667
3/21/2005 10565.39 1116.21 57.24 2.475936
3/22/2005 10470.51 1125.38 55.43 2.401042
3/23/2005 10456.02 1128.94 53.84 2.421053
3/24/2005 10442.87 1140.84 54.84 2.391753
3/28/2005 10485.65 1136.2 53.74 2.408377
3/29/2005 10405.7 1133.35 54.4 2.412698
3/30/2005 10540.93 1134.43 54.39 2.513966
3/31/2005 10503.76 1140.65 55.59 2.519774
4/1/2005 10404.3 1144.06 57.27 2.497207
4/4/2005 10421.14 1134.41 56.8 2.475138
4/5/2005 10458.46 1130.3 55.82 2.466667
4/6/2005 10486.02 1135.02 55.85 2.427027
4/7/2005 10546.32 1132.05 53.87 2.445652
4/8/2005 10461.34 1133.56 53.32 2.445055
4/11/2005 10448.56 1132.01 53.73 2.531792
4/12/2005 10507.97 1125.29 51.38 2.517241
4/13/2005 10403.93 1136.47 50.38 2.540698
4/14/2005 10278.75 1131.33 51.18 2.556886
4/15/2005 10087.51 1142.18 50.49 2.572289
4/18/2005 10071.25 1140.42 50.62 2.598765
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4/19/2005 10127.41 1122.5 53.87 2.6375 
4/20/2005 10012.36 1116.64 53.64 2.60241 
4/21/2005 10218.6 1124.99 54.25 2.645963
4/22/2005 10157.71 1121.2 55.39 2.613497
4/25/2005 10242.47 1120.68 53.9 2.578313
4/26/2005 10151.13 1121.28 54.12 2.575758
4/27/2005 10198.8 1114.94 51.21 2.651899
4/28/2005 10070.37 1113.05 51.7 2.614907
4/29/2005 10192.51 1095.41 49.72 2.614907
5/2/2005 10251.7 1093.56 50.73 2.567073
5/3/2005 10256.95 1089.19 49.43 2.576687
5/4/2005 10384.64 1088.68 50.39 2.58642 
5/5/2005 10340.38 1091.49 51.3 2.532544
5/6/2005 10345.4 1084.1 50.96 2.538462
5/9/2005 10384.34 1095.7 52.46 2.563636
5/10/2005 10281.11 1096.44 51.74 2.567073
5/11/2005 10300.25 1097.28 50.01 2.518072
5/12/2005 10189.48 1095.45 48.34 2.481928
5/13/2005 10140.12 1087.12 48.67 2.487952
5/16/2005 10252.29 1098.7 48.82 2.512195
5/17/2005 10331.88 1113.99 49.16 2.466667
5/18/2005 10464.45 1121.53 48.83 2.431953
5/19/2005 10493.19 1119.55 49.09 2.473054
5/20/2005 10471.91 1117.49 48.65  
 
